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PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS:
ONLINE ACCESS AND THE LOSS OF
PRACTICAL OBSCURITY
David S. Ardia*
Court records present a conundrum for privacy advocates. Public access to the courts has long been a fundamental tenant of American democracy, helping to ensure that our system of justice functions
fairly and that citizens can observe the actions of their government.
Yet court records contain an astonishing amount of private and sensitive information, ranging from social security numbers to the names
of sexual assault victims. Until recently, the privacy harms that attended the public disclosure of court records were generally regarded
as insignificant because court files were difficult to search and access.
But this “practical obscurity” is rapidly disappearing as the courts
move from the paper-based world of the twentieth century to an interconnected, electronic world where physical and temporal barriers to
information are eroding.
These changes are prompting courts—and increasingly, legislatures—to reexamine public access to court records. Although this
reexamination can be beneficial, a number of courts are abandoning
the careful balancing of interests that has traditionally guided judges
in access disputes and instead are excluding whole categories of information, documents, and cases from public access. This approach,
while superficially appealing, is contrary to established First Amendment principles that require case-specific analysis before access can be
restricted and is putting at risk the public’s ability to observe the functioning of the courts and justice system.
This article pushes back against the categorical exclusion of information in court records. In doing so, it makes three core claims.
First, the First Amendment provides a qualified right of public access
to all court records that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power. Second, before a court can restrict public access, it must
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D.R. Jones, Anne Klinefelter, Cathy Packer, Mary-Rose Papandrea, Stephen Smith, Peter Winn, participants at the 2016 Privacy Law Scholars Conference at George Washington University, and participants at the 2016 Internet Law Works-in-Progress Symposium at New York Law School for helpful
comments and discussion. Thank you also to Sierra Lyda, Patrick Redmon, Maddie Salamone, Robert
Sparks, and James Wudel for exceptional research assistance.
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engage in a case-specific evaluation of the privacy and public access
interests at stake. Third, per se categorical restrictions on public access are not permissible.
These conclusions do not leave the courts powerless to protect
privacy, as some scholars assert. We must discard the notion that the
protection of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff.
Instead, we need to shift the responsibility for protecting privacy to
lawyers and litigants, who should not be permitted to include highly
sensitive information in court files if it is not relevant to the case. Of
course, we cannot eliminate all private and sensitive information from
court records, but as long as courts continue to provide physical access to their records, the First Amendment does not preclude court
administrators from managing electronic access in order to retain
some of the beneficial aspects of practical obscurity. By minimizing
the inclusion of unnecessary personal information in court files and
by limiting the extent of electronic access to certain types of highly
sensitive information, we can protect privacy while at the same time
ensuring transparency and public accountability.
I.
II.
III.
IV.

V.
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INTRODUCTION

Court records present a conundrum for privacy advocates. Public
access to the courts has long been a fundamental tenant of American
democracy, helping to ensure that our system of justice functions fairly
and that citizens can observe the actions of their government. Yet court
records contain an astonishing amount of private and sensitive information, ranging from social security numbers to the names of sexual as1
sault victims. Given that “[t]he courts are a stage where many of life’s
dramas are performed, where people may be shamed, vindicated, com2
pensated, punished, judged, or exposed,” it should come as no surprise
that court records, which serve as a chronicle of these dramas, are littered with private and sensitive information about the litigants, witnesses, jurors, and others who come voluntarily or involuntarily into contact
with the court system.
Until recently, the privacy harms associated with court records were
generally regarded as insignificant because court files were difficult to
search and access. In the language of privacy scholars, the information in
court files was “practically obscure” in the sense that private and sensitive information could appear in what were ostensibly “public” records
without creating a significant risk of actual widespread public disclosure
3
or harm. The need to travel to the courthouse, identify the relevant case,
locate the specific record, and copy the material made the information in
court records difficult to access and share with others. But this obscurity
is rapidly diminishing as courts adopt online record systems that allow
the public to search and download records without ever having to set
foot in a courthouse.
As a result, court records that would have drawn little scrutiny in
the past can now spread like wildfire across social media and the Internet’s many discussion forums. For example, when a former saleswoman
at the real estate company Zillow sued the company for sexual harassment and wrongful termination, her complaint, which described sexually
charged messages from male colleagues, drew hundreds of thousands of
4
readers. And it is not just lurid sexual details that can catch the public’s
attention and cause embarrassment; “[i]ntimate, often painful allegations
1. See David S. Ardia & Anne Klinefelter, Privacy and Court Records: An Empirical Study, 30
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1807, 1825–27, 1881–90 (2015) (discussing the wide range of privacy interests
that are implicated by public access to courts records).
2. Amanda Conley et al., Sustaining Privacy and Open Justice in the Transition to Online Court
Records: A Multidisciplinary Inquiry, 71 MD. L. REV. 772, 774 (2012).
3. “Practical obscurity” refers to the idea that even information that is publicly available can
still have private attributes if it is difficult to access, find, or contextualize. See Woodrow Hartzog &
Frederic Stutzman, The Case for Online Obscurity, 101 CALIF. L. REV. 1, 21 (2013).
4. See Jodi Kantor, Lawsuits’ Lurid Details Draw an Online Crowd, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 23, 2015,
at A1.
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in lawsuits—intended for the scrutiny of judges and juries—are increasingly drawing in mass online audiences far from the courthouses where
5
they are filed.”
Moreover, the wealth of information in court records has not escaped the attention of commercial entities that aggregate and consolidate
6
information from governmental and private sources. Data aggregators
such as Acxiom, ChoicePoint, LexisNexis, and the national credit bureaus routinely mine court records for personally identifiable information they then incorporate with other data sources to create detailed
7
dossiers on almost every American. While much of the information in
court records may seem innocuous in isolation, when it is combined with
other publicly available data, the resulting intrusions into privacy can be
8
significant.
The ease with which court records can now be accessed and disseminated online is prompting courts to reconsider their public accessibility.
Although this reexamination can be valuable, a number of courts are
moving away from the careful balancing of interests that has traditionally
guided judges and instead are excluding whole categories of information,
documents, and cases from public access. This approach, while superficially appealing, is contrary to established First Amendment doctrines
that require case-specific analysis before access to the courts can be re9
stricted. Moreover, the increasing use of categorical exemptions is putting at risk the public’s ability to observe the functioning of the courts
and the justice system.
This Article pushes back against the categorical exclusion of information in court records. In doing so, it makes three core claims. First, the
First Amendment provides a qualified right of access to all court records
10
that are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power. Second,
before a court can restrict public access to court records, it must engage
in a case-specific examination of the privacy and public access interests at

5. Id.; see also Marc Davis, Do You Want Your Divorce on the Web?; Lawyers Debate How
Much Info Should Be Aired, VIRGINIAN-PILOT, Feb. 9, 1997, at J1; Todd Wallack, Court Access Debate Persists, BOS. GLOBE (June 15, 2015), https://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2015/06/14/after-manyclosed-door-meetings-massachusetts-courts-ask-for-public-view-public-records/6zUlSQ67IRbJvIlT
hrlOgN/story.html.
6. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, DATA BROKERS: A CALL FOR TRANSPARENCY AND
ACCOUNTABILITY § IV (2014), https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/data-brokers-calltransparency-accountability-report-federal-trade-commission-may-2014/140527databrokerreport.pdf
(describing a growing industry that combines public records, information on the web, and proprietary
data). For more on the role of data aggregators, see infra notes 28–35 and accompanying text.
7. Fred H. Cate, Government Data Mining: The Need for A Legal Framework, 43 HARV. C.R.C.L. L. REV. 435, 457 (2008).
8. Daniel J. Solove, Access and Aggregation: Public Records, Privacy and the Constitution, 86
MINN. L. REV. 1137, 1185 (2002) [hereinafter Solove, Access and Aggregation] (“Viewed in isolation,
each piece of our day-to-day information is not all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to
paint a portrait about our personalities.”).
9. See David S. Ardia, Court Transparency and the First Amendment, 38 CARDOZO L. REV. 835,
915–16 (2017) [hereinafter Ardia, Court Transparency].
10. This argument builds on my prior work on court transparency. See generally id.
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stake. Third, the First Amendment does not permit per se categorical restrictions on public access.
Recognizing a constitutional right of access to court records does
not leave the courts powerless to protect privacy. Courts can significantly
reduce the amount of privacy-harming information in their records by
shifting the responsibility for protecting private information to lawyers
and litigants, who should not be permitted to include highly sensitive information in court files if it is not relevant to the case. In addition, as
long as they continue to provide physical access to their records, the First
Amendment does not preclude courts from managing electronic access
to retain some of the beneficial aspects of practical obscurity.
Part II situates the discussion of public access to court records within the overall debate about privacy and government records. As privacy
advocates have long lamented, government records contain a significant
amount of private and sensitive information. Part II highlights two related developments that are forcing a reexamination of many of our assumptions about the proper balance between privacy and public information. First, the online availability of government records is making the
information in them less obscure. Second, commercial data aggregators
are increasingly mining these records for personally identifiable information and then applying big data tools and techniques to create comprehensive profiles about individuals.
Part III explains why court transparency is important and describes
the source and scope of the public’s right of access to court records. Part
IV then explores how courts—and to a growing extent, legislatures—are
attempting to resolve the tension between privacy and court transparency. Like other First Amendment rights, the right of access to court records is not absolute. Courts can restrict public access when the interests
supporting secrecy warrant it, but the standards for doing so are quite
high. Although scholars have long debated whether the public should
have a right of access to court records and whether privacy interests
ought to receive greater protection, few have addressed the specifics of
11
how a First Amendment right of access should be implemented, and
none have done so comprehensively. Part IV fills this gap in the scholarship by answering three essential questions courts cannot avoid when
considering public access claims: Who has a right to access court records?; What records does the public have a right to access?; And how
must the courts provide access?
Part V concludes by taking on the widely held belief that the competing interests of court transparency and privacy are irreconcilable, offering some preliminary thoughts on how the courts can reconcile court
access and privacy by moving beyond this “zero-sum” thinking. Several
11. Scholars who have done so include Conley et al., supra note 2; Lynn M. LoPucki, CourtSystem Transparency, 94 IOWA L. REV. 481 (2009); Peter W. Martin, Online Access to Court Records—
from Documents to Data, Particulars to Patterns, 53 VILL. L. REV. 855 (2008); and Peter A. Winn,
Online Court Records: Balancing Judicial Accountability and Privacy in an Age of Electronic Information, 79 WASH. L. REV. 307 (2004).
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solutions are possible. First, courts should reduce the amount of privacyharming information that ends up in their files in the first place, much of
which is unnecessary to the adjudication of the underlying claims. Second, courts should pay careful attention to how they design their online
access systems so the values of both public access and privacy are maximized. Finally, as an institution, the courts should play a much more active
role in studying the threats to privacy that court records present, as well
as the impact that limiting online access will have on court transparency.
II. PRIVACY AND PUBLIC RECORDS
It is no secret that the government maintains records about us. It
could not function without doing so. Many people would be shocked,
however, to know how extensive these records are and how readily governmental entities share the information they collect with others. While
the government has long kept detailed information on its citizens, the
adoption of electronic record systems and the explosion of commercial
entities that collect, aggregate, and sell public records is forcing a reexamination of the impact that public records have on privacy.
Governments at all levels collect and maintain a wide variety of
records about their citizens. For example, everyone who is born in the
United States is issued a birth certificate, which includes his or her name,
date of birth, place of birth, parents’ names and ages, and mother’s
12
maiden name, among other information. The government continues to
collect additional information about us at many of the most important
milestones in our lives. Marriage records typically contain our full name,
13
former names, date and place of birth, gender, and home address. Divorce records contain similar details, coupled in many cases with highly
14
personal information about the parties’ conduct during the marriage.
Voting records list our political party affiliation, date of birth, place of
birth, home address, telephone number, and sometimes even our social
15
security number. Property records contain descriptions of homes we
own, including the address, size of the house, number of bedrooms and
16
bathrooms, and the home’s value.
12. See, e.g., CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 102425 (West 2016) (requiring child’s name, sex,
and birthdate and parents’ names and birthplaces to be provided on birth certificates); see also 10A
N.C. ADMIN. CODE 41H.0601 (2016) (same).
13. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 351 (West 2016) (requiring birth names, mailing addresses, and
birthdates); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 51-8 (2016) (requiring social security numbers).
14. See Nancy S. Marder, From “Practical Obscurity” to Web Disclosure: A New Understanding
of Public Information, 59 SYRACUSE L. REV. 441, 446 (2009) (“Divorce cases can produce information
about assets, infidelities, and child custody disputes.”).
15. See, e.g., N.C. GEN. STAT. § 163-82.4 (requiring name, date of birth, address, gender, race,
party affiliation, telephone number, and driver’s license number or last four digits of social security
number); CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 2., § 19055 (2016) (requiring birthdate, birth place, current address,
occupation, and political party for registration and requesting social security and telephone numbers).
16. See, e.g., CAL REV. & TAX. CODE § 408.3 (West 2016) (making “property characteristics”
including “the year of construction of improvements to the property, their square footage, the number
of bedrooms and bathrooms of all dwellings, the property’s acreage, and other attributes of or amenities to the property, such as swimming pools, views, zoning classifications or restrictions, use code des-
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For those individuals who are unlucky enough to come into contact
with law enforcement or the legal system, the number of government
records expands significantly. Arrest records typically include one’s
name, photograph, occupation, physical description, fingerprints, date of
17
birth, and the factual circumstances surrounding the arrest. Police records also contain information about the victims of crimes, including their
home and work addresses, medical conditions, and occupational infor18
mation. If a criminal or civil matter ends up in court, the depth of intrusion into personal matters can seem endless. Court records contain eve19
rything from bank account numbers to psychological evaluations. And
it is not just the parties in litigation who need to worry about the presence of personal information in a court’s files. Sensitive information
about witnesses, jurors, and other third parties often appears in court
20
documents.
For the most part, the records described above are open to public
inspection at county and municipal offices, local courthouses, police departments, and other government offices. Statutes such as the federal
21
Freedom of Information Act and state public records laws, as well as
22
state and federal common law and the First Amendment, provide the
23
public with access to many of these records. Indeed, access to government records is considered to be essential for the public to participate in
24
and contribute to our republican system of self-government. As James
Madison once warned, “popular government without popular information, or the means of acquiring it, is but a prologue to a farce, or a
25
tragedy, or perhaps both.”
Transparency, however, has costs. Like the rest of society, government is in the midst of a transformation from a largely paper-based world
ignations, and the number of dwelling units of multiple family properties” public); N.C. GEN. STAT.
§ 105-319 (listing owner’s name and values of properties along with other information from Department of Revenue prescribed assessments).
17. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(1) (West 2016) (mandating that the police make public
the name, occupation, physical description, charges, and circumstances of all arrests made); N.C. GEN.
STAT. § 132-1.4(c)(2) (making information of arrests public, including “[t]he name, sex, age, address,
employment, and alleged violation of law of a person arrested, charged, or indicted”).
18. See, e.g., CAL. GOV’T CODE § 6254(f)(2) (making the name and age of reported victims public); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 132-1.4(c)(6) (making “[t]he name, sex, age, and address” of an alleged victim
public).
19. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1828–50 (identifying 140 types of private and sensitive information that can appear in court records).
20. See id.
21. See 5 U.S.C. § 552 (2012). The federal Freedom of Information Act is known as “FOIA.”
Every state has an open records law, many of which are modeled on FOIA. See, e.g., Public Records
Act, CAL. GOV’T CODE §§ 6250–6277; Public Records Law, N.C. Gᴇɴ. Sᴛᴀᴛ. § 132-1 to -11.
22. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 847–50.
23. As early as 1641, the Massachusetts Body of Liberties, the first legal code in New England,
provided a right of access to government records. See MASS. BODY OF LIBERTIES, art. 48 (1641)
(“Every inhabitant of the Country shall have free liberty to search and view any Roles, Records or
Registers of any Court or office . . . .”).
24. See infra Part III.
25. Letter from James Madison to W.T. Barry (Aug. 4, 1822), in THE WRITINGS OF JAMES
MADISON (Gaillard Hunt ed. 2000).
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to an interconnected electronic world where physical and temporal barriers to information are eroding. As a result of this transformation, a
growing proportion of government records can now be searched,
browsed, and downloaded online without the cost and hassle that typical26
ly accompany access to paper records. Not surprisingly, as accessing and
sharing government records becomes easier, the risks to privacy increase
as well.
Discussions of government transparency often conjure the image of
the well-meaning civic gadfly who keeps tabs on the government by scru27
tinizing government reports and budget documents. Yet the primary users of most government records are commercial entities commonly
known as “data brokers” that aggregate and consolidate information
from governmental and private sources, which they then sell to other pri28
vate parties—and in some cases back to the government. By combining
the information found in government records with consumer purchase
data, web browsing activities, warranty registrations, and other details of
consumers’ everyday actions, these data aggregators are able to create
29
highly detailed summaries of nearly every person.
As other scholars have documented, the aggregation and sale of this
30
information is very big business. Daniel Solove’s work on the aggregation of public records has been particularly illuminating. According to
Solove, we have “a system where the government extracts personal information from the populace and places it in the public domain, where it
is hoarded by private sector corporations that assemble dossiers on al31
most every American citizen.” The end result, Solove concludes, is a
“growing dehumanization, powerlessness, and vulnerability for individu32
als.”
Commercial data aggregators are also increasingly applying “big data” tools and techniques to profile individuals and to predict and influ33
ence their behavior. With enormous data sets, inexpensive storage, and
vast computing power, data aggregators and their clients can analyze bil26. See Micah Altman et al., Towards A Modern Approach to Privacy-Aware Government Data
Releases, 30 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1967, 1987 (2015) (describing the various ways that governments
release information).
27. See Margaret B. Kwoka, FOIA, Inc., 66 DUKE L.J. 1361, 1364 (2016).
28. See, e.g., id. at 1361 (describing the corporate use of FOIA, including “a cottage industry of
companies whose entire business model is to request federal records under FOIA and resell them at a
profit”); see also FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6.
29. According to the Federal Trade Commission, data brokers collect and store billions of data
elements covering nearly every U.S. consumer. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 6, at 46–47.
30. See, e.g., Cate, supra note 7; Chris Jay Hoofnagle, Big Brother’s Little Helpers: How ChoicePoint and Other Commercial Data Brokers Collect and Package Your Data for Law Enforcement, 29
N.C. J. INT’L L. & COMMERCIAL REG. 595, 596 (2004); Neil M. Richards & Jonathan H. King, Big Data Ethics, 49 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 393, 404 (2014); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at
1149.
31. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1142.
32. Id. at 1141.
33. See Ian Kerr & Jessica Earle, Prediction, Preemption, Presumption: How Big Data Threatens
Big Picture Privacy, 66 STAN. L. REV. ONLINE 65, 69 (2013); Richards & King, supra note 30, at 397–
405.
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lions of disparate pieces of information to identify previously hidden pat34
terns. As Neil Richards and Jonathan King warn, “[t]he increasing
adoption of big data is such that all kinds of human activity, ranging from
dating to hiring, voting, policing, and identifying terrorists, have already
35
become heavily influenced by big data techniques.”
For years, privacy scholars have been sounding the alarm about the
36
ways public records are exploited for commercial and other purposes.
Concern is only increasing, however, as more and more government records are going online, raising the risk of identity theft, stalking, domestic
violence, and other safety issues. In fact, individuals can now do the kind
of matching of public records that was traditionally performed only by
large data aggregators. A group of students at Johns Hopkins University,
for example, replicated the methods of companies like ChoicePoint by
downloading and linking public record databases containing death records, property tax information, campaign donations, and occupational
37
license registries. The researchers were then able to search by name only and discover an individual’s date of birth, home address, phone number, occupation, political party registration, voting history, and spouse’s
38
name and the price they paid for their home.
One of the challenges the law faces in addressing privacy concerns
that arise from public access to government records is the deeply entrenched view that privacy is dichotomous: information is either public or
39
private, but it cannot be both. Under this view, because government
records are ostensibly “public,” there can be no claim to privacy when
the information in government records is widely shared or combined
40
with other information. A number of privacy scholars have strongly
pushed back against this binary approach to privacy, arguing that it “fails
to account for the realities of the Information Age, where information is
41
rarely completely confidential.” Given the extent of the information
34. See, e.g., Charles Duhigg, How Companies Learn Your Secrets, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (Feb. 16,
2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/02/19/magazine/shopping-habits.html (“[A member of Target’s
data analytics team identified] about 25 products that, when analyzed together, allowed him to assign
each shopper a ‘pregnancy prediction’ score. More important, he could also estimate her due date to
within a small window, so Target could send coupons timed to very specific stages of her pregnancy.”).
35. Richards & King, supra note 30, at 405.
36. See, e.g., Grayson Barber, Personal Information in Government Records: Protecting the Public Interest in Privacy, 25 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 63, 65 (2006); Hoofnagle, supra note 30, at 596–97;
Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy in an Information Age: The Problem of Privacy in Public, 17 LAW & PHIL.
559, 561, 577 (1998); Neil M. Richards, The Dangers of Surveillance, 126 HARV. L. REV. 1934, 1958–59
(2013); Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1142.
37. See Tom Zeller, Jr., Personal Data for the Taking, N.Y. TIMES (May 18, 2005), http://
query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?res=9C01EFD91639F93BA25756C0A9639C8B63&pagewanted
=all (describing the work of graduate students in a computer security course at Johns Hopkins University).
38. Id.
39. See Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 13–20; Nissenbaum, supra note 36, at 559 n.2.
40. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1140 (arguing for the rejection of the
“longstanding notion that there is no claim to privacy when information appears in a public record”).
41. Id. at 1140–41; accord Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 20 (“The public/private dichotomy in the law is flawed because it relies on largely arbitrary distinctions that fail to reflect Internet
users’ notions of privacy.”).
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that we share with the government and private entities, privacy scholars
warn that “clinging to the notion of privacy as [requiring] total secrecy
42
would mean the practical extinction of privacy in today’s world.”
What Daniel Solove and other privacy-law scholars argue is that the
label of “public” or “private” should not be determinative. Two scholars
in particular have been especially influential in pushing for a reconsideration of the public/private dichotomy that exists in much of privacy law.
The first is Helen Nissenbaum, who has developed a framework for evaluating privacy called “contextual integrity,” based on the central tenet
43
that privacy must be judged on a continuum. For Nissenbaum, privacy
has been violated whenever there is a breach of contextual integrity, i.e.,
whenever the norms of appropriate use or flow of information have been
44
transgressed.
Extending Nissenbaum’s theory of contextual integrity, Woodrow
Hartzog argues that “[t]he concept of obscurity can play a key role in ad45
dressing the issues that the secrecy paradigm overlooks.” According to
Hartzog, obscurity captures the notion that “when information is hard to
46
obtain or understand, it is, to some degree, safe.” Hartzog concludes
that accounting for the obscurity of information, “could help courts and
47
lawmakers determine if information is eligible for privacy protections.”
As discussed in the next Section, obscurity has long been recognized as
serving a privacy-enhancing function in protecting sensitive information
48
in public records, but its conceptual force is especially applicable to
court records.

42. Daniel J. Solove, Conceptualizing Privacy, 90 CALIF. L. REV. 1087, 1152 (2002).
43. Helen Nissenbaum, Privacy as Contextual Integrity, 79 WASH. L. REV. 119, 137 (2004)
(“[T]here are no arenas of life not governed by norms of information flow, no information or spheres
of life for which ‘anything goes.’”). For Nissenbaum, the idea that information labeled as “public” is
categorically undeserving of privacy protection is belied by the fact that “[a]lmost everything—things
that we do, events that occur, transactions that take place—happens in a context not only of place but
of politics, convention, and cultural expectation.” Id.
44. Id. at 138 (“[I]n any given situation, a complaint that privacy has been violated is sound in
the event that . . . norms [of appropriateness or the flow of information have] been transgressed.”).
45. Woodrow Hartzog & Evan Selinger, Surveillance as Loss of Obscurity, 72 WASH. & LEE L.
REV. 1343, 1358 (2015).
46. Id.
47. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 2. In the context of online communication, Hartzog
and his co-author Fredric Stutzman assert that obscurity can be said to exist when at least one of four
“key factors” that play an essential role in the discovery or comprehension of information is missing:
“(1) search visibility, (2) unprotected access, (3) identification, and (4) clarity.” Id. We will return to
the relevance of these factors to online court records in Part V.
48. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749,
780 (1989) (noting the “practical obscurity of rap-sheet information” and concluding that the compilation of these publicly accessible law enforcement records can raise privacy concerns under FOIA);
Burnett v. Cty. of Bergen, 968 A.2d 1151, 1164 (N.J. 2009) (“[B]ulk disclosure of realty records to a
company planning to include them in a searchable, electronic database would eliminate the practical
obscurity that now envelops those records at the Bergen County Clerk’s Office.”).
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Sensitive Information in Court Records

Although privacy concerns can arise whenever the government
shares the information it collects about individuals, privacy risks are particularly acute in the context of court records, which contain some of our
most intimate and sensitive information. A court’s file for a single case
may consist of thousands of records, including motions, pleadings, briefs,
transcripts, exhibits entered into evidence, and documents produced during pre-trial discovery such as medical records, credit reports, and tax re49
turns that have been filed with the court. Each of these records can contain personal information about the parties and other individuals,
including dates of birth, home addresses, places of employment, medical
50
conditions, sexual histories, and social security numbers.
In a study examining the extent of private and sensitive information
in the briefs and appendices submitted to the North Carolina Supreme
Court from 1984 to 2000, Anne Klinefelter and I found that these records
contained an average of 113 appearances of sensitive information per
51
document. The most frequently occurring types of sensitive information
we found in the documents were related to a person’s location, identity,
52
criminal history, health, and finances. We also found that criminal information, such as crime victim names, criminal charges, and the names
53
of subjects under investigation, is particularly pervasive in court records
and warned that “[t]he combination of online and data broker exposure
of often stale and incomplete arrest and conviction information [can create] long-term barriers to fresh starts including negative impacts on ‘employment and housing prospects, parental rights, educational opportunities, freedom of movement, and just about every other aspect of daily
54
life.’”
Although some of this information may appear innocuous by itself,
when it is linked to other publicly available information, such as voting,
phone, and property records, the potential harm to privacy increases
55
exponentially. Daniel Solove calls this the “aggregation problem”:
Viewed in isolation, each piece of our day-to-day information is not
all that telling; viewed in combination, it begins to paint a portrait
about our personalities. The aggregation problem arises from the
49. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 781.
50. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1838–51 (identifying 140 types of private and sensitive information that can appear in court records).
51. See id. at 1857–59. We found that sensitive information, however, was not uniformly distributed throughout the records; most documents contained fewer than forty pieces of sensitive information, while a handful of documents contained more than 1,000 pieces. See id. at 1858. Our study
used a stratified random sample by year of documents pulled from 12,137 briefs and other filings from
the North Carolina Supreme Court. Id. at 1851. In total, we analyzed 504 documents containing 24,156
pages drawn from 466 cases. See id. at 1851, 1853.
52. Id. at 1861.
53. Id. at 1883–84.
54. Id. at 1841 (quoting Jenny Roberts, Expunging America’s Rap Sheet in the Information Age,
2015 WIS. L. REV. 321, 327 (2015)).
55. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782; Marder, supra note 14, at 447.
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fact that the digital revolution has enabled information to be easily
amassed and combined. Even information in public records that is
superficial or incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data
about individuals. Information breeds information. For example,
although one’s social security number does not in and of itself reveal much about an individual, it provides access to one’s financial
information, educational records, medical records, and a whole host
56
of other information.
And it is not just the litigants whose privacy interests may be implicated by information in a court’s files. In fact, a great deal of sensitive information associated with nonparties ends up in court records because
these individuals typically have no one advocating to protect their priva57
cy. This includes witnesses and other individuals who come into contact
with one of the parties or who are otherwise brought into the resolution
58
of a case. In fact, even jurors must worry about their privacy, as court
records often contain their names, addresses, occupations, and places of
employment, as well as their answers to highly personal voir dire ques59
tions.
B.

The Diminishing Role of Practical Obscurity

Although concerns about the public disclosure of sensitive information in court records existed long before the Internet, many privacy
scholars see the move to electronic court records as effectuating a quali60
tative shift in the risks that public access portends. While court records
have long been open to public inspection, the difficulty of actually accessing individual documents made the information in these records practically obscure. Over the past decade, however, courts across the country
have been moving to make their records available online, and many
courts require litigants to file their pleadings, motions, and other docu61
ments in electronic format. As a result, it now takes little effort to find
and link information across cases, courts, and states.
In 2012, several computer scientists and a lawyer led by renowned
privacy scholar Helen Nissenbaum published an empirical study that examined how the shift from paper-based, locally-accessible court records
to online access is impacting the disclosure of personal information con56. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1185.
57. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 781.
58. Id.
59. See, e.g., ALA. R. CRIM. P. SAMPLE FORM 56, http://judicial.alabama.gov/library/rules/
crsam56.pdf (providing a Uniform Juror Questionnaire containing forty-eight questions plus six optional questions addressing such matters as jurors’ affiliations, hobbies, reading and viewing practices,
and opinions).
60. See, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 2, at 808; Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 16–20; Martin, supra note 11, at 869–70; Winn, supra note 11, at 314–18.
61. See Martin, supra note 11, at 872 (“By the end of 2007, electronic filing was an option in
nearly all federal trial courts and was mandatory in a large number . . . .”); John T. Matthias, E-Filing
Expansion in State, Local, and Federal Courts 2007, in FUTURE TRENDS IN STATE COURTS 2007, at 34,
34 (Carol R. Flango et al. eds., 2007) (reporting that, as of 2007, twenty-six states had adopted court
rules enabling e-filing statewide or in at least one court).
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tained in court records. After visiting a number of state courthouses, the
researchers found that they had to commit significant time and effort to
63
locate and access the physical records they sought. For example, to access paper records at a New Jersey courthouse, they had to travel to the
courthouse, pass through courthouse security, and find the appropriate
64
case in the court’s case index. They then had to provide the case’s docket number to a clerk, who retrieved the document and made a copy, but
65
only after they paid the copying fee at a separate “fee station.” As the
researchers noted, accessing court records in this fashion “was time66
consuming” and necessitated “interact[ing] with clerks at every step.”
Moreover, they could not search for records across multiple courthouses
and found that “it was difficult to access records for which we did not
67
know exactly what we were looking.”
With the move to online court records, these impediments to access
are vanishing. Although the specifics of electronic access vary by state
(and sometimes by court), in all federal courts and in many state courts
that provide online access, the public can access a court’s electronic case
database through a website interface. That interface typically provides
the ability to search by party names, case type, keywords, and other information and typically also provides case-by-case browsing. If users wish
to copy a document, they can usually do so by downloading it directly to
their computer as a PDF file.
The United States federal courts were the first to implement elec68
tronic access to case information, doing so in 1990. The current system
in use in the federal courts, known as Public Access to Court Electronic
Records (“PACER”), allows for public online access to all federal dis69
trict courts, bankruptcy courts, and appellate courts. PACER’s Case
Locator permits users of the system to search by party name or social security number depending on the type of case; the search will return the
names of the parties, the court where the case is filed, the case number,
70
the date filed, and the date closed. A user can filter results by court type
(e.g., civil, criminal, appellate), court name (e.g., Southern District of
New York or Eastern District of North Carolina), year in which the case
62

62. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 808–14 (describing their study).
63. Id. at 820–21.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 818–19. They were charged $.75 per page at a New Jersey courthouse but noted that
New Jersey’s Superior Court website listed a lower fee. Id. at 819.
66. Id. at 820.
67. Id. at 822.
68. See Martin, supra note 11, at 860, 872.
69. PACER works in conjunction with the Case Management/Electronic Case Files
(“CM/ECF”) system, which was implemented in the bankruptcy courts in 2001, the federal district
courts in 2002, and the appellate courts in 2004. FAQs: Case Management/Electronic Case Files
(CM/ECF), U.S. COURTS, http://www.uscourts.gov/courtrecords/electronic-filing-cmecf/faqs-casemanagement-electronic-case-files-cmecf (last visited June 20, 2017).
70. See Frequently Asked Questions, PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/psc/faq.html (click “How
can I search a PACER database?”). In order to access the search interface or to download documents,
a user has to register with PACER by providing a name, address, and credit card number. Id.
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was filed, nature of suit (e.g., contract, antitrust, civil rights), or case title.
A user can also browse records based on the nature of the suit, look at all
cases that have been filed or decided within a certain time period, and
download copies of filed documents through the Case Management/Electronic Case Files (“CM/ECF”) system, which charges $.10 per
71
page. Although PACER provides access only to the federal courts, a
number of state courts have similar electronic filing and retrieval systems, and many more will be implementing such systems over the next
72
decade.
Not surprisingly, when Nissenbaum and her team compared online
access with physical access at the courthouse, they concluded that “there
are significant differences in the cost of retrieving various types of personal information about a data subject” and that these differences have
73
an impact on the patterns of information flow. Indeed, it is important to
recognize that electronic record systems are not simply an additional
means of public access to court records, akin to an online clerk’s office
where hardcopy equivalents can be requested and copied more easily.
Electronic court record systems provide much more than that. They spur
uses of court records that were previously difficult, or in some cases impossible, to accomplish. In the paper-based world of court records, one
had to know the case number in order to access a court record at the
clerk’s office. With electronic court records, the information in a court’s
files can be searched, sorted, and combined with other information without any need to maintain the record’s connection to a specific case. In
other words, users of the information need not know anything about the
underlying case or even that the information came from a court record.
The information simply becomes another piece of de-contextualized data
that can be put to almost any use. As Peter Martin has noted, “[t]his allows inspection of litigation records along lines and from vantage points
74
that were previously blocked.”
The adoption of electronic record systems is also eliminating the effects of the passage of time on the accessibility of court records, which
typically would become more obscure over time. Paper records are costly
to maintain and court clerks inevitably face difficult choices regarding
the preservation of closed case files. The lifecycle for a court record typically involves increasing levels of obscurity as the record moves from a
court’s active files to the clerk’s archives and eventually to long-term
75
storage or destruction. Electronic court records are rarely subject to this
71. Id. Users are only charged a maximum of $3 per document. Id.
72. This is not to say that PACER is without its critics. See, e.g., LoPucki, supra note 11, at 486–
88 (cataloging the many problems that researchers face when using PACER); Letter from Carl Malamud, President, Public.Resource.Org, to Mr. Robert Lowney, Chief, Programs Div., Admin. Office
of the U.S. Courts (Mar. 31, 2015) [hereinafter Malamud Letter to Mr. Lowney], https://law.resource.
org/pacer/pacer.uscourts.gov.20150331.pdf (criticizing what he sees as the “collection of excessive revenues in a manner contrary to law by the Administrative Office in significant amounts”).
73. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 814.
74. Martin, supra note 11, at 885.
75. See id. at 869–70.
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temporal degradation in access. As a result, records from cases that conclude today will remain just as accessible a decade from now.
Furthermore, the heaviest users of electronic court records have
been commercial entities, particularly data brokers and other information resellers, who benefit tremendously from the economies of scale
76
electronic-record systems offer. Peter Martin, who has examined the
history of PACER, writes that this is not by chance: “the [PACER] system has unmistakably been shaped to meet the needs of this business sector. The federal bankruptcy courts, historically a critical information
source for the credit industry and those serving it, have been the engine
driving the spread of remote access, digital case records and electronic
77
filing.” According to Martin, as of 2008, “[r]oughly seventy percent of
78
PACER usage concern[ed] bankruptcy cases.”
While the courts have generally been slow to consider the implications of technology on privacy, the Supreme Court recognized in 1989
that when the government aggregates otherwise public information in
79
computer databases, it increases the risks to privacy. In United States
Department of Justice v. Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press,
the Court faced the question of whether the disclosure of the Federal
Bureau of Investigation’s (“FBI”) criminal identification records database of “rap sheets” on over 24 million persons “could reasonably be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy” within
80
the meaning of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). Concluding
that the “privacy interest in maintaining the practical obscurity of rap81
sheet information will always be high,” the Court treated the aggregation of information as central to its analysis of the degree to which privacy interests would be harmed by the disclosure of the FBI’s database:
Recognition of this attribute of a privacy interest supports the distinction, in terms of personal privacy, between scattered disclosure
of the bits of information contained in a rap sheet and revelation of
the rap sheet as a whole. . . . [T]he issue here is whether the compilation of otherwise hard-to-obtain information alters the privacy interest implicated by disclosure of that information. Plainly there is a
vast difference between the public records that might be found after
a diligent search of courthouse files, county archives, and local police stations throughout the country and a computerized summary
82
located in a single clearinghouse of information.
76. See, e.g., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT OF THE
NATIONAL TASK FORCE ON PRIVACY, TECHNOLOGY, AND CRIMINAL JUSTICE INFORMATION, 56–57
(2001); Martin, supra note 11, at 867; Rebecca Hulse, E-Filing and Privacy, CRIM. JUST., Summer
2009, at 14, 16.
77. Martin, supra note 11, at 867.
78. Id.
79. See U.S. Dep’t of Justice v. Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 489 U.S. 749, 762–64
(1989).
80. Id. at 751.
81. Id. at 780.
82. Id. at 764.
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In light of the additional privacy risks associated with the aggregation of rap-sheet information, the Court ultimately held that disclosure of
the FBI database’s contents to third parties could reasonably be expected
to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy within the
meaning of FOIA’s law-enforcement exemption and was therefore ex83
empt from disclosure under the statute. It should be noted that the
Court’s decision did not address the public’s right of access to court records, but rather a request for access under FOIA. The standard for determining whether public access can be denied under FOIA is less demanding than the standard for restricting access to court records; all the
government was required to show was that disclosure “could reasonably
84
be expected to constitute an unwarranted invasion of personal privacy.”
Given concerns about the commercial exploitation of electronic
court records and the increased risks to privacy, a number of courts and
legislatures are considering—and some have begun to implement—
substantial curtailments of public access through restrictions on certain
users and uses of court records, redaction of electronic and print records,
85
and the removal of categories of court records from public access. Before we consider whether these approaches are permissible and normatively desirable, it is important to understand why open courts are important and what benefits can flow from public access to court records.
III. OPEN COURTS AND THE BENEFITS OF PUBLIC ACCESS
Americans have long enjoyed the most transparent court system in
86
the world. Public access to the courts provides many benefits, including
ensuring that our justice system functions fairly and that citizens can un87
derstand the actions of their government. Public access even offers
therapeutic value to the community, as Chief Justice Warren Burger observed in Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia:
The early history of open trials in part reflects the widespread acknowledgment, long before there were behavioral scientists, that
public trials had significant community therapeutic value. Even
without such experts to frame the concept in words, people sensed
from experience and observation that, especially in the administration of criminal justice, the means used to achieve justice must have
the support derived from public acceptance of both the process and
88
its results.
Although public access to court proceedings and records is
longstanding and deeply ingrained in the American legal system, the precise source and contours of the public’s right of access to the courts re83. Id. at 780.
84. Id. at 756 (quoting 5 U.S.C. § 552(b)(7)(C) (1982)).
85. See infra Part IV.
86. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 484.
87. See, e.g., Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise I), 464 U.S. 501, 508 (1984);
Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court (Globe Newspaper), 457 U.S. 596, 604–05 (1982).
88. 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980).
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main murky. The Supreme Court itself has held that the First Amendment mandates a presumption of public access only to criminal trials and
89
some pre-trial proceedings. Nevertheless, as I argue both here and
90
elsewhere, the Supreme Court’s rationale for recognizing a First
Amendment right of access to criminal proceedings—that public access is
essential to self-government—applies with equal force to civil proceedings and court records. Indeed, as discussed below, many lower courts already recognize a First Amendment right of access to civil proceedings
and court records.
A.

Court Transparency and the First Amendment

In what was considered at the time to be a “watershed case,” the
Supreme Court held in 1980 in Richmond Newspapers that the guarantees of the First Amendment’s press and speech clauses necessitate a
91
public right to attend criminal trials. In that case, Chief Justice Warren
Burger acknowledged that the First Amendment does not explicitly require public access to the courts, but he concluded nonetheless that the
Amendment’s provisions implied that such a right exists: “[i]n guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment
can be read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to
92
give meaning to those explicit guarantees.”
In a series of cases that followed Richmond Newspapers, the Court
went on to hold that a First Amendment right of access could apply in
other criminal contexts, including preliminary hearings and voir dire pro93
ceedings. Yet the Court’s access decisions left two important questions
unanswered: (1) whether the First Amendment’s right of access to criminal proceedings also applies to civil proceedings; and (2) whether a right
of access extends to the records associated with those proceedings.
Previously, I examined the Supreme Court’s public access jurisprudence and concluded that the doctrinal and theoretical bases for the
Court’s recognition of a First Amendment right of access to criminal
proceedings apply with equal force to civil proceedings and to court rec94
ords. Judges and scholars have identified a variety of benefits that flow
from allowing the public to observe the activities of the courts, such as:
95
safeguarding the integrity of the fact-finding process; ensuring the fair89. Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 919.
90. Id. at 889–906.
91. 448 U.S. at 580 (plurality opinion). In his concurring opinion in Richmond Newspapers, Justice Stevens wrote: “This is a watershed case. Until today the Court has accorded virtually absolute
protection to the dissemination of information or ideas, but never before has it squarely held that the
acquisition of newsworthy matter is entitled to any constitutional protection whatsoever.” Id. at 582
(Stevens, J., concurring).
92. Id. at 575.
93. See Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Court (Press-Enterprise II), 478 U.S. 1 (1986) (holding that
the First Amendment provides a right of access to preliminary hearings); Press-Enterprise ), 464 U.S.
at 510–11 (holding that a right of access to jury voir dire exists).
94. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 910–12.
95. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, 457 U.S. 596, 606 (1982).
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ness of judicial proceedings; educating the public about the implementa97
tion and impact of the law; promoting public confidence in the justice
98
99
system; supporting the development of the common law; informing the
100
public about important safety and welfare issues; fostering discussion
101
about matters of public concern; and providing therapeutic value to the
102
community.
Even a cursory review of this list reveals that the benefits that flow
from public access extend beyond criminal trials. Indeed, following its
decision in Richmond Newspapers, the Court went on to explain in Globe
Newspaper v. Superior Court that public access to the courts “serves to
ensure that the individual citizen can effectively participate in and con103
tribute to our republican system of self-government.” Justice William
Brennan, who wrote the majority opinion in Globe Newspaper Co., clarified why this is so: “[u]nderlying the First Amendment right of access to
criminal trials is the common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that
Amendment was to protect the free discussion of governmental af104
fairs.’” Brennan made a similar observation in his Richmond Newspapers concurrence, where he linked court transparency to the First
Amendment’s “structural role” of fostering self-government:
Implicit in this structural role is not only “the principle that debate
on public issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open,”
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, but the antecedent assumption
that valuable public debate as well as other civic behavior must be
informed. The structural model links the First Amendment to that
process of communication necessary for a democracy to survive,
and thus entails solicitude not only for communication itself, but for
105
the indispensable conditions of meaningful communication.
Moreover, there is no principled way to limit a First Amendment
right of access only to criminal trials. As I have pointed out elsewhere, it
makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of access on the benefits that public access provides to individual criminal proceedings, or
even to the court system as a whole: “[w]hile a just and effective court
system is undoubtedly an important public good, it is not a core First
96

96. See, e.g., In re Cont’l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1313–14 (7th Cir. 1984).
97. See, e.g., United States v. Criden, 648 F.2d 814, 827 (3d Cir. 1981).
98. See, e.g., Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508.
99. See, e.g., Symposium, Panel Discussion Judicial Records Forum, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1735,
1745–46 (2015).
100. See, e.g., United States v. Mitchell, 551 F.2d 1252, 1258 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101. See, e.g., Landmark Commc’ns, Inc. v. Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 839 (1978).
102. See Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 570–71 (1980).
103. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (citing Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 95 (1940)).
This theory of the First Amendment is most commonly associated with Alexander Meiklejohn. See
generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, POLITICAL FREEDOM: THE CONSTITUTIONAL POWERS OF THE
PEOPLE 27 (1965) (discussing the importance of freedom of speech in regards to self-governance).
104. 457 U.S. at 604–05 (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218 (1966)).
105. Richmond Newspapers, 448 U.S. at 587 (Brennan, J., concurring) (footnotes omitted); see
also William J. Brennan, Jr., Address at the Dedication at Newhouse Center for Law and Justice (Oct.
17, 1979), in 32 RUTGERS L. REV. 173, 176 (1979) (“[T]he First Amendment protects the structure of
communications necessary for the existence of our democracy.”).
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Amendment value. Public access takes on First Amendment significance
106
because it advances the First Amendment’s structural purpose.” In
other words, public access to the courts is of First Amendment signifi107
cance because it makes informed self-government possible. If citizens
are the ultimate sovereigns, as the Constitution presupposes, they must
have access to the information necessary to evaluate the actions of their
108
government.
Although it may be the case that public access plays a particularly
important role in criminal cases—where a defendant’s liberty is directly
at stake—the benefits of public access unquestionably flow from public
109
access to civil cases as well. In fact, the public’s interest in civil proceedings is at least as great as its interest in criminal proceedings given how
110
wide ranging civil litigation is. This is so even when the government is
not a party. As Lee Levine has noted, civil litigation “can, and does, establish legal rules governing social policy from medical malpractice and
environmental hazards to dangerous products, toxic pollution, and other
111
issues that impact the public health and safety.”
Recognizing the importance of public access to civil proceedings,
nearly all federal appellate courts apply a First Amendment right of ac112
113
cess to civil cases, as do many state supreme courts.
B.

The First Amendment Right to Access Court Records

Although the Supreme Court has not expressly held that the First
Amendment provides a right of access to court records, the Court’s precedents appear to recognize such a right, and many lower courts have
concluded that a right of access to judicial records logically flows from
106. Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 894.
107. Id. at 890–91.
108. Id. at 918.
109. Id. at 906–918.
110. See Gannett v. DePasquale, 443 U.S. 368, 386 n.15 (1979) (“[I]n some civil cases the public
interest in access, and the salutary effect of publicity, may be as strong as, or stronger than, in most
criminal cases.”).
111. See LEE LEVINE ET AL., NEWSGATHERING AND THE LAW § 6.01 (4th ed. 2011).
112. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 786 (9th Cir. 2014); Grove Fresh
Distribs., Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir. 1994); Republic of Philippines v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659 (3d Cir. 1991); Rushford v. New Yorker Magazine, Inc., 846
F.2d 249, 253 (4th Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 408, 408 n.4 (1st Cir.
1987); Westmoreland v. Columbia Broad. Sys., Inc., 752 F.2d 16, 23 (2d Cir. 1984); Publicker Indus.,
Inc. v. Cohen, 733 F.2d 1059, 1071 (3d Cir. 1984); In re Cont’l Ill. Secs. Litig., 732 F.2d 1302, 1308 (7th
Cir. 1984); In re Iowa Freedom of Info. Council, 724 F.2d 658, 661 (8th Cir. 1984); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1178–79 (6th Cir. 1983); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796,
801 (11th Cir. 1983). Only the D.C. Circuit has held to the contrary. See also Ctr. for Nat’l Sec. Stud. v.
U.S. Dep’t of Justice, 331 F.3d 918, 935 (D.C. Cir. 2003) (“Neither this Court nor the Supreme Court
has ever indicated that it would apply the Richmond Newspapers test to anything other than criminal
judicial proceedings.”).
113. See, e.g., Rapid City Journal v. Delaney, 804 N.W.2d 388, 395 (S.D. 2011); Assoc. Press v.
State, 888 A.2d 1236, 1244–45 (N.H. 2005); NBC Subsidiary (KNBC–TV), Inc. v. Superior Court, 980
P.2d 337, 358 (Cal. 1999); New Jersey Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. J.B., 576 A.2d 261, 270 (N.J.
1990); Mokhiber v. Davis, 537 A.2d 1100, 1108 (D.C. 1988); Barron v. Florida Freedom Newspapers,
Inc., 531 So. 2d 113, 117–18 (Fla. 1988).
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the Court’s public access decisions. Moreover, as I have argued elsewhere, the First Amendment right of access would be diminished, if not
115
made meaningless, if it did not extend to court records.
In the Supreme Court’s two Press-Enterprise cases applying a First
Amendment right of access to pre-trial criminal proceedings, the Court
reversed both the closure of the proceedings and the sealing of the accompanying records. In Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“PressEnterprise I”), the trial judge excluded the public from nearly all of the
jury voir dire proceedings in a murder case and refused to release the
116
transcript even after the trial ended. In a unanimous decision, the Supreme Court held that the First Amendment right of access attaches to
117
jury voir dire. In striking down the trial court’s closure orders, the
Court implicitly recognized that the First Amendment right of access extended to the transcript too:
“Not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to
closure and to total suppression of the transcript. The trial judge
should seal only such parts of the transcript as necessary to preserve
118
the anonymity of the individuals sought to be protected.”
Two years later in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court (“PressEnterprise II”), the Court faced this issue a second time when a magistrate judge excluded the public from a forty-one day preliminary hearing
119
and refused to release the transcript. Again, the Supreme Court held
that the First Amendment provided a right of access to the proceeding in
question and intimated that the public had a right to access the transcript
120
as well. In fact, in reversing the lower court’s closure orders, the Court
seemed to see the sealing of the transcript as an additional affront to the
public’s right of access:
Denying the transcript of a 41-day preliminary hearing would frustrate what we have characterized as the “community therapeutic
value” of openness . . . . “The value of openness lies in the fact that
people not actually attending trials can have confidence that standards of fairness are being observed; the sure knowledge that anyone
is free to attend gives assurance that established procedures are being followed and that deviations will become known. Openness thus
enhances both the basic fairness of the criminal trial and the appearance of fairness so essential to public confidence in the sys121
tem.”
Following the Supreme Court’s decisions in the Press-Enterprise
cases, all of the federal circuits that have addressed the issue of access to
114

114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See infra notes 116–25 and accompanying text.
See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 916–18.
464 U.S. 501, 503–04 (1984).
Id. at 513.
Id. (emphasis added).
478 U.S. 1, 4–5 (1986).
Id. at 13.
Id. (citations omitted) (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 508).
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court records in criminal cases have held that the public has a First
122
Amendment right of access to such records, as have many state su123
preme courts. Most courts have extended a First Amendment right of
124
access to records filed in civil proceedings as well. As the First Circuit
observed, “the basis for this right is that without access to documents the
public often would not have a ‘full understanding’ of the proceeding and
therefore would not always be in a position to serve as an effective check
125
on the system.”
Indeed, it makes little sense to treat court records differently from
court proceedings under the First Amendment. The reason the Supreme
Court recognized a First Amendment right of access to court proceedings
in the first place is that public access facilitates “the free discussion of
126
governmental affairs.” If the First Amendment requires a right of access to court proceedings to ensure that discussion about the government
is well informed, then it logically follows that the public must also have
122. See In re Providence Journal Co., 293 F.3d 1, 10 (1st Cir. 2002) (extending the right of access
to documents and “kindred materials submitted in connection with the prosecution and defense of
criminal proceedings”); United States v. Valenti, 987 F.2d 708, 715 (11th Cir. 1993) (criminal dockets);
Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 287–88 (D.C. Cir. 1991) (plea agreements); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th Cir. 1988) (search warrant
applications); N.Y. Times Co. v. Biaggi, 828 F.2d 110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (documents filed in connection with pretrial suppression hearings); Storer Commc’ns, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir.
1987) (materials related to recusal motion); United States v. Edwards, 823 F.2d 111, 118 (5th Cir. 1987)
(transcripts of closed preliminary hearings); Wash. Post Co. v. Soussoudis, 807 F.2d 383, 390 (4th Cir.
1986) (documents filed in connection with plea and sentencing hearings); United States v. Peters, 754
F.2d 753, 763 (7th Cir. 1985) (trial exhibits); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111 (3d Cir. 1985)
(bills of particulars); Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court for Cent. Dist. of Cal., 705 F.2d 1143, 1145
(9th Cir. 1983) (documents filed in pretrial proceedings). The Tenth Circuit has avoided deciding
whether there is a First Amendment right of access to criminal or civil court records. See Riker v. Fed.
Bureau of Prisons, 315 Fed. Appx. 752, 756 (10th Cir. 2009) (“Even assuming, without deciding, that
there is a First Amendment right to court documents, that right is not absolute. . . . [A]ny interest Mr.
Jordan has is outweighed by the safety needs of Mr. Riker.”); United States v. McVeigh, 119 F.3d 806,
812 (10th Cir. 1997) (“[F]or the purposes of this opinion, we assume without deciding that access to
judicial documents is governed by the analysis articulated in Press–Enterprise II.”).
123. See, e.g., State v. Ross, 543 A.2d 284, 285 (Conn. 1988); Oahu Publ'ns Inc. v. Ahn, 331 P.3d
460, 485 (Haw. 2014); Commonwealth v. Doe, 648 N.E.2d 1255, 1258 (Mass. 1995), abrogated by
Commonwealth v. Pon, 14 N.E.3d 182 (Mass. 2014); In re VV Publ'g Corp., 577 A.2d 412, 417-18 (N.J.
1990); Nichols v. Jackson, 2002 OK 65, ¶ 12, 55 P.3d 1044, 1046; State v. Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 239
(Utah 1993); Circuit Court of Eighth Judicial Dist. v. Lee Newspapers, 2014 WY 101, 332 P.3d 523, 530
(Wyo. 2014).
124. See, e.g., Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 267 (4th Cir. 2014); Newsday L.L.C. v. Cty. of
Nassau, 730 F.3d 156, 164 (2d Cir. 2013); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 86, 93 (2d
Cir. 2004); Grove Fresh Distribs., Inc., 24 F.3d at 897; Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc.,
998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir. 1993); Rushford, 846 F.2d at 253; In re Cont'l Ill. Sec. Litig., 732 F.2d at 1309;
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1177; Ex parte Capital U-Drive-It, Inc., 630 S.E.2d
464, 469 (S.C. 2006). But see In re Reporters Comm. for Freedom of the Press, 773 F.2d 1325, 1331-40
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (finding no First Amendment right to discovery materials); Zenith Radio Corp. v.
Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co., 529 F. Supp. 866, 908 (E.D. Pa. 1981) (“With respect to the question
whether the common law right to inspect and copy [discovery materials] has a constitutional dimension, we conclude that it does not.”).
125. In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d 47, 52 (1st Cir. 1984) (quoting Associated Press, 705
F.2d at 1145); see also United States v. Salemme, 985 F. Supp. 193, 195 (D. Mass. 1997) (noting that
access to court records is “often important to a full understanding of the way in which the judicial process and the government as a whole are functioning.”).
126. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214, 218
(1966)); see also supra notes 94–96 and accompanying text.
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access to the materials with which the courts work, including documents,
evidence, and legal briefs, to understand how and why a court arrived at
127
its decisions. As the District of Columbia Circuit remarked:
A court proceeding, unlike the processes for much decisionmaking
by executive and legislative officials, is in its entirety and by its very
nature a matter of legal significance; all of the documents filed with
the court, as well as the transcript of the proceeding itself, are main128
tained as the official “record” of what transpired.
Admittedly, some lower courts remain unsure whether the First
Amendment requires public access to court records or whether the public merely enjoys a common law right of access. This uncertainty can be
traced to the Supreme Court’s decision in Nixon v. Warner Communica129
tions, which preceded by two years the Court’s pronouncement in
Richmond Newspapers that the First Amendment provides a public right
130
of access to criminal trials. In Nixon, several television networks sought
access to tape recordings that had been introduced as evidence at the trial of President Nixon’s former advisors on charges of conspiring to ob131
struct justice in connection with the Watergate investigation. Although
the trial court made transcripts of the recordings available to the public,
the media companies argued that the public should be able to hear the
132
actual conversations, replete with nuance and inflection.
Instead of resolving the question of whether the First Amendment
provides a right of access to the tapes, the Court sidestepped the consti133
tutional issue by focusing on the public availability of the transcripts.
Because the tapes had already been played in open court, the Court concluded that “[t]here is no question of a truncated flow of information to
134
the public.” The only issue the Court saw with regard to the First
Amendment was whether “copies of the White House tapes—to which
the public has never had physical access—must be made available for
135
copying.” Seeing this as a case about special access for the press, the
Court held that “[t]he First Amendment generally grants the press no
right to information about a trial superior to that of the general public,”
136
which could have listened to the tapes in the courtroom. In framing the
127. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 911–12 (noting the essential role that court
records play in the public’s understanding of the courts); Martin, supra note 11, at 859 (“[E]ffective
public understanding and scrutiny of the judicial process require access to rulings of the court and to
documents filed by parties.”); accord In re Globe Newspaper Co., 729 F.2d at 52; In re Cont’l Ill. Sec.
Litig., 732 F.2d at 1308; United States v. Criden, 675 F.2d 550, 556 (3d Cir. 1982); Salemme, 985 F.
Supp. at 195.
128. Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 906 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
129. 435 U.S. 589, 598 (1978).
130. 448 U.S. 555, 583 (1980).
131. Nixon, 435 U.S. at 592–94.
132. Id. at 589.
133. Id. at 609.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id. The Supreme Court did state in Nixon that there is a common-law right to “inspect and
copy public records and documents, including judicial records and documents.” Id. at 597. As a result,
even courts that do not recognize a First Amendment right of access to court records acknowledge
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issue as it did, the Court left open the question of whether the First
Amendment would have been implicated if the trial court had refused to
provide any public access to the contents of the tapes.
As I have argued elsewhere, the few courts that do not apply a First
Amendment right of access to court records are misreading Nixon and
137
ignoring the Supreme Court’s subsequent access decisions. The Supreme Court has made clear that a central purpose of the First Amendment is to ensure that citizens can effectively participate in and contrib138
ute to our republican system of self-government. The majority of courts
have recognized that to effectuate this goal the public’s right of access to
the courts must extend to the materials in a court’s files because the documents and other materials associated with court proceedings are indis139
pensable for the public to understand the work of the courts. As the
Third Circuit concluded in United States v. Antar:
Access to the documentation of an open proceeding . . . facilitates
the openness of the proceeding itself by assuring the broadest dissemination. It would be an odd result indeed were we to declare
that our courtrooms must be open, but that transcripts of the proceedings occurring there may be closed, for what exists of the right
of access if it extends only to those who can squeeze through the
140
door?

that the public has a common-law right of access to judicial records in both civil and criminal cases.
See, e.g., IDT Corp. v. eBay, 709 F.3d 1220, 1222 (8th Cir. 2013); Hagestad v. Tragesser, 49 F.3d 1430,
1433–34 (9th Cir. 1995); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Techs., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 161 (3d Cir.
1993); Republic of Phil. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 949 F.2d 653, 659–60 (3d Cir. 1991); Smith v.
U.S. Dist. Ct., 956 F.2d 647, 649–50 (7th Cir. 1991); Johnson v. Greater Se. Cmty. Hosp. Corp., 951
F.2d 1268, 1277 (D.C. Cir. 1991); EEOC v. Erection Co., 900 F.2d 168, 170 (9th Cir. 1990); Littlejohn v.
BIC Corp., 851 F.2d 673, 677–78 (3d Cir. 1988); FTC v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410
(1st Cir. 1987); Valley Broad. Co. v. U.S. Dist. Ct., 798 F.2d 1289, 1292–93 (9th Cir. 1986); Wilson v.
Am. Motors Corp., 759 F.2d 1568, 1570 (11th Cir. 1985); Joy v. North, 692 F.2d 880, 893 (2d Cir. 1982);
see also Richard J. Peltz et al., The Arkansas Proposal on Access to Court Records: Upgrading the
Common Law with Electronic Freedom of Information Norms, 59 ARK. L. REV. 555, 591–94 (2006)
(listing state decisions).
137. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 873–78.
138. See supra notes 101–03 and accompanying text.
139. See, e.g., Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 492 (1975) (“[O]fficial records and documents open to the public are the basic data of governmental operations.”); Mueller v. Raemisch, 740
F.3d 1128, 1135–36 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Secrecy makes it difficult for the public (including the bar) to understand the grounds and motivations of a decision, why the case was brought (and fought), and what
exactly was at stake in it.”); Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 93 (2d Cir. 2004)
(“[R]ight of access to judicial documents [is] derived from or a necessary corollary of the capacity to
attend the relevant proceedings.”); United States v. Amodeo, 71 F.3d 1044, 1048 (2d Cir. 1995) (“[Public monitoring of the courts] is not possible without access to . . . documents that are used in the performance of Article III functions.”); Newman v. Graddick, 696 F.2d 796, 803 (11th Cir. 1983) (“This
right, like the right to attend judicial proceedings, is important if the public is to appreciate fully the
often significant events at issue in public litigation and the workings of the legal system.”).
140. 38 F.3d 1348, 1360 (3d Cir. 1994).
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IV. RESOLVING THE TENSION BETWEEN PRIVACY AND COURT ACCESS
Although public access to the courts is an important feature of the
American legal system, the public does not have an absolute right to ac141
cess court proceedings and records. As with other First Amendment
rights, public access can be denied when countervailing interests are sufficiently compelling. The Supreme Court has warned, however, that “the
142
State’s justification in denying access must be a weighty one” and that
“[c]losed proceedings, although not absolutely precluded, must be ra143
re.” Although the Court has used slightly different wording when evaluating restrictions on public access—sometimes requiring that re144
strictions be “essential to preserve higher values” and at other times
stating that they must be “necessitated by a compelling governmental in145
terest” —the test for restricting public access to the courts generally
matches the Supreme Court’s strict scrutiny test, as applied in other First
146
Amendment contexts.
As the preceding paragraph suggests, the public’s right of access
generally takes precedent over most countervailing interests. Under the
strict scrutiny test, the “strong presumption” of public access can be
overcome when three requirements are satisfied: (1) the restrictions on
access advance a compelling interest that is likely to be prejudiced by
public access; (2) the restrictions are no broader than necessary to protect that interest; and (3) there are no other reasonable alternatives to
147
restricting public access. The latter two requirements involve a “primarily empirical judgment about the means” used to advance the state’s
148
interest. As Eugene Volokh explains, “[i]f the means do not actually
further the interest, are too broad, are too narrow, or are unnecessarily
burdensome, then the government can and should serve the end through
149
[alternative means].”
141. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 606 (1980).
142. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606.
143. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509.
144. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 13–14 (“[P]roceedings cannot be closed unless specific, on
the record findings are made demonstrating that ‘closure is essential to preserve higher values and is
narrowly tailored to serve that interest.’”) (quoting Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510).
145. Globe Newspaper, 457 U.S. at 606–07 (“Where . . . the State attempts to deny the right of
access . . . it must be shown that the denial is necessitated by a compelling governmental interest, and
is narrowly tailored to serve that interest.”).
146. See, e.g., Kamasinski v. Judicial Review Council, 44 F.3d 106, 109 (2d Cir. 1994) (concluding
that “strict scrutiny is the correct standard” to be applied in access disputes governed by the First
Amendment).
147. Courts sometimes differ about the level of certainty that must be shown in order to establish
harm, at times requiring the likelihood of prejudice while at other times requiring a substantial probability of prejudice. Compare N.Y.C. Civil Liberties Union v. N.Y.C. City Transit Auth., 684 F.3d 286,
304 (2d Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted) (requiring “an overriding interest
that is likely to be prejudiced”), with United States v. Guerrero, 693 F.3d 990, 1002 (9th Cir. 2012) (internal quotations omitted) (citation omitted) (requiring a showing that “there is a substantial probability that, in the absence of closure, this compelling interest would be harmed”).
148. Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech, Permissible Tailoring and Transcending Strict Scrutiny,
144 U. PA. L. REV. 2417, 2419 (1996).
149. Id.
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Additionally, if a court concludes that restrictions on public access
are warranted, it must provide specific on-the-record findings justifying
150
its conclusion. The Supreme Court instructed in Press-Enterprise I that
“[t]he interest [supporting closure] is to be articulated along with findings
specific enough that a reviewing court can determine whether the closure
151
order was properly entered.” The requirement of on-the-record findings, however, is not solely for the benefit of appellate review. It “exists,
most fundamentally, to assure careful analysis by the [trial] court before
any limitation is imposed, because reversal cannot fully vindicate First
152
Amendment rights.”
As described below, courts have adopted a variety of approaches to
reconciling the tension between privacy and court access. In fact, in many
courthouses, the details of public access are left to court clerks, who fash153
ion access policies from a variety of legal sources. This Section describes how the First Amendment right of access to court records should
be carried out.
At the outset, however, it should be noted that many questions regarding how to implement public access to court records remain unresolved. Nevertheless, there are three essential questions that courts cannot avoid when considering public access claims. Who has a right to
access court records? What records does the public have a right to access? And how must the courts provide this access?
A.

Limits on Who May Access Court Records

The first question that arises is whether the courts can place limits
on who may access court records. This question can come up in two different ways. First, a court may seek to impose restrictions on the identity
of those who are granted access to court records. Second, a court may attempt to impose restrictions on how the records can be used once they
are acquired from the court.
1.

Restrictions on the Identity of Court Record Users

Given that the most frequent users of court records are commercial
entities—a fact that creates heightened concerns about privacy because
these entities typically aggregate court records with other information—
some commentators have proposed prohibiting commercial users from
150. See, e.g., Richmond Newspapers v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555, 581 (1980); Romero v. Drummond
Co., 480 F.3d 1234, 1244 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Quattrone, 402 F.3d 304, 313–14 (2d Cir.
2004); In re Time Inc., 182 F.3d 270, 272 (4th Cir. 1999); People v. LaGrone, 838 N.E.2d 142, 547 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2005).
151. Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510.
152. United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1362 (3d Cir. 1994).
153. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 787 (“[R]estrictions on access trickle down from state and federal appellate courts to the local courthouses themselves, where state and local law, custom, and in
some cases simply the whims of court clerks determine which information in the court record will actually be made available to the public, and how.”).
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accessing government records. Such an approach, however, would almost certainly run afoul of the First Amendment.
As a general matter, the First Amendment does not permit the government to discriminate between different types of private actors with
regard to their expressive activities. In a long line of cases, the Supreme
Court has held that First Amendment rights do not depend on the identity of a speaker and that the government cannot single out some types of
speakers for differential treatment unless it can demonstrate a compel155
ling reason for doing so. For example, the government cannot arbitrari156
ly exclude reporters from White House press conferences, distinguish
between media and nonmedia defendants for purposes of defamation
157
158
law, impose a higher tax rate on newspapers of a certain size, or refuse to allow certain members of the press to interview government offi154

154. See Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1216 (suggesting that courts “curtail
broad categories of uses (i.e., commercial, information brokering, further disclosure, and so on).”);
Daniel J. Solove & Chris Jay Hoofnagle, A Model Regime of Privacy Protection, 2006 U. Iʟʟ. L. Rᴇᴠ.
357, 375 (2006) (“[A]ccessing public records to obtain data for commercial solicitation should be prohibited.”).
155. See, e.g., Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 558 U.S. 310, 340–41 (2010) (“[T]he Government may commit a constitutional wrong when by law it identifies certain preferred speakers.”);
Grosjean v. Am. Press Co., 297 U.S. 233, 251 (1936) (enjoining enforcement of a gross receipts tax
imposed only on newspapers with circulation of more than 20,000 copies per week). As the Supreme
Court noted in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, the Court “has upheld a narrow class
of speech restrictions that operate to the disadvantage of certain persons, but these rulings were based
on an interest in allowing governmental entities to perform their functions.” 558 U.S. at 341 (citing
Bethel School Dist. No. 403 v. Fraser, 478 U.S. 675, 683 (1986) (protecting the “function of public
school education”)); Jones v. N.C. Prisoners’ Labor Union, Inc., 433 U.S. 119, 129 (1977) (furthering
“the legitimate penological objectives of the corrections system”) (internal quotation marks omitted);
Parker v. Levy, 417 U.S. 733, 759 (1974) (ensuring “the capacity of the Government to discharge its
[military] responsibilities”) (internal quotation marks omitted); U.S. Civil Serv. Comm’n v. Nat’l Ass’n
of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548, 557 (1973) (“[F]ederal service should depend upon meritorious performance rather than political service . . . .”).
156. See Sherrill v. Knight, 569 F.2d 124, 129 (D.C. Cir. 1977); see also Am. Broad. Cos. v. Cuomo,
570 F.2d 1080, 1083 (2d Cir. 1977) (holding that political candidates could not selectively exclude ABC
from “public function[s]” while admitting other media representatives); United Teachers of Dade v.
Stierheim, 213 F. Supp. 2d 1368, 1373–74 (S.D. Fla. 2002) (teachers’ union and editor of union newspaper could not be excluded from the press room reserved for members of the “general-circulation”
media and relegated to a “separate but equal” media room); Borreca v. Fasi, 369 F. Supp. 906, 909–10
(D. Haw. 1974); Westinghouse Broad. Co. v. Dukakis, 409 F. Supp. 895, 896 (D. Mass. 1976) (selective
exclusion of one television station from press conference violated the First Amendment) (enjoining
mayor from excluding reporter from general news conferences).
157. See Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 753 (1985) (plurality
opinion) (rejecting the Vermont Supreme Court’s conclusion that nonmedia defendants are not entitled to First Amendment protection); id. at 773 (White, J., concurring); see also id. at 784 (Brennan, J.,
joined by Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens, JJ., dissenting). Although the Supreme Court’s decision in
Philadelphia Newspapers, Inc. v. Hepps seemed to put the rejection of the media/nonmedia distinction
in Dun & Bradstreet into question, see 475 U.S. 767, 779 n.4 (1986), such a view is against the weight of
authority in the lower courts, see, for example, Obsidian Fin. Grp., LLC v. Cox, 740 F.3d 1284 (9th Cir.
2014); Underwager v. Salter, 22 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 1994), and is in conflict with the Court’s language in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 352 (“We have consistently rejected the proposition that the institutional press has any constitutional privilege beyond that of other speakers.”).
158. See Grosjean, 297 U.S. at 251; see also Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc. v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221,
230 (1987) (“[O]fficial scrutiny of the content of publications as the basis for imposing a tax is entirely
incompatible with the First Amendment’s guarantee of freedom of the press.”).
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cials. Nor may the government suppress speech on the basis of the
160
speaker’s corporate identity. As the Court reaffirmed in Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission, “[t]he First Amendment does not
permit Congress to [disadvantage speakers] based on the corporate iden161
tity of the speaker and the content of the political speech.”
Although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed whether
the First Amendment prohibits a court from providing access to court
records to only some members of the public, and while this issue has not
received much attention in the lower courts, some cases have held that
discriminatory access to court information can violate the First Amend162
ment. The First Circuit’s decision in Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc. illustrates the constitutional problems that can arise when courts provide un163
equal access to court records. In Anderson, the district court sealed the
records associated with a civil lawsuit related to the discharge of toxic
chemicals into the water supply in Woburn, Massachusetts, but it granted
WGBH, which was preparing a documentary for the Public Broadcasting
164
Services NOVA television series, access to some records. The case,
which ultimately served as the basis for a national bestseller and movie
titled A Civil Action, generated a great deal of public interest, and when
CBS, Inc. and The Boston Globe requested access to documents that had
been provided to WGBH, the district court refused to grant them ac165
cess.
In reversing the district court’s protective order, the First Circuit
wrote:
Our main concern with the exception for WGBH . . . is not with the
jury’s exposure to the information, but with the government’s granting of access only to designated media entities. . . . [T]his exception
gave WGBH the exclusive ability among the media to gather in159

159. See Chi. Reader v. Sheahan, 141 F. Supp. 2d 1142, 1147 (N.D. Ill. 2001); Times Picayune
Publ’g Co. v. Lee, Civ. A. No. 88-1325, 1988 WL 36491, at *1 (E.D. La. 1988).
160. See, e.g., Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 364.
161. Id.
162. See, e.g., Huminski v. Corsones, 386 F.3d 116, 121, 146 (2d Cir. 2004) (holding that the First
Amendment was violated when the trial court singled out “a long-time critic of the Vermont justice
system . . . for exclusion from the courtroom”); Anderson v. Cryovac, Inc., 805 F.2d 1, 9 (1st Cir. 1986)
(holding that a court “may not selectively exclude news media from access to information otherwise
made available for public dissemination”); United States v. Connolly, 204 F. Supp. 2d 138, 139–40 (D.
Mass. 2002) (refusing to remove subpoenaed reporters from the courtroom and noting that it “is beyond dispute that only in the most extraordinary circumstances is the government permitted, consistent with the First Amendment, to discriminate between members of the press in granting access to
trials and other governmental proceedings”); cf. First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 785
(1978) (noting that discriminatory restrictions may represent a governmental “attempt to give one side
of a debatable public question an advantage in expressing its views to the people”); Legi-Tech, Inc. v.
Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 733 (2d Cir. 1985) (holding that providing preferential access to legislative materials to one legislative information service violated the First Amendment rights of a competing service).
163. 805 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1986).
164. Id. at 3. WGBH was prohibited from revealing the information it obtained from these
sources until after jury selection. Id.
165. Id. at 4. The excluded media companies sought access to records filed by the parties in support of their motions to compel discovery and for summary judgment. Id.
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formation and release it to the public. By the grace of the court,
WGBH became a privileged media entity that could, over a four
month period, review otherwise confidential information and shape
the form and content of the initial presentation of the material to
the public. It is of no consequence that others could then republish
the information WGBH had chosen to release. A court may not selectively exclude news media from access to information otherwise
166
made available for public dissemination.
The First Circuit went on to note that allowing a court to provide public
access to some members of the public but not to others was a clear violation of the First Amendment:
The danger in granting favorable treatment to certain members of
the media is obvious: it allows the government to influence the type
of substantive media coverage that public events will receive. Such
a practice is unquestionably at odds with the first amendment. Neither the courts nor any other branch of the government can be allowed to affect the content or tenor of the news by choreographing
167
which news organizations have access to relevant information.
While some commentators have argued that the “press” should receive additional rights and protections under the First Amendment be168
yond those provided to the public generally, that view has never com169
manded a majority of the justices on the Supreme Court. Instead, the
Court has been wary of granting certain media entities preferential
treatment under the First Amendment and has evidenced skepticism that
170
such line drawing is even possible. As a result, the freedoms the press
receives from the First Amendment are no different from the freedoms
171
everyone enjoys under the Speech Clause. In the context of court access, for example, the Court has repeatedly framed the issue as one of a
right of access by the public and has refused to grant the press any special
172
rights beyond those enjoyed by the public.
166. Id. at 9.
167. Id.
168. See Melville B. Nimmer, Introduction—Is Freedom of the Press a Redundancy: What Does it
Add to Freedom of Speech?, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 639, 641 (1975); Potter Stewart, “Or of the Press,” 26
HASTINGS L.J. 631, 633–34 (1975); Sonja R. West, Awakening the Press Clause, 58 UCLA L. REV.
1025, 1027 (2011).
169. See, e.g., First Nat’l Bank of Bos. v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 798 (1978) (Burger, C.J., concurring) (“[T]he history of the [Press] Clause does not suggest that the authors contemplated a ‘special’ or
‘institutional’ privilege.”); see also David A. Anderson, The Origins of the Press Clause, 30 UCLA L.
REV. 455, 456 (1983) (“Thus far the Supreme Court has declined to give independent significance to
the phrase ‘freedom of the press.’”).
170. See, e.g., Dun & Bradstreet, Inc. v. Greenmoss Builders, Inc., 472 U.S. 749, 781–82 (1985);
Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665, 703–04 (1972).
171. David A. Anderson, Freedom of the Press, 80 TEX. L. REV. 429, 430 (2002) (“The press is
protected from most government censorship, libel judgments, and prior restraints not because it is the
press but because the Speech Clause protects all of us from those threats.”). This is not to say that media entities do not enjoy special privileges that are not available to the general public. As David Anderson notes: “Nonconstitutional sources of special protection for the press are . . . numerous.” Id. at
432.
172. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9; Houchins v. KQED, Inc., 438 U.S. 1, 14 (1978); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978); Pell v. Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 834 (1974). As a
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In practical terms, the recognition that the First Amendment precludes the courts from discriminating between members of the public
with regard to access to court records would not mark a dramatic shift in
the current practice of most courts. The federal courts, for example, do
not exclude any individuals or entities from accessing publicly available
court records, and PACER is available to anyone who registers for an
173
account. State courts appear to be similarly permissive in their court
access policies, at least with regard to who can access publicly available
174
paper records.
2.

Restrictions on the Uses of Court Records

Instead of restricting who can access court records, courts may seek
to limit how the information in court records can be used. For example,
some statutes and court rules prohibit certain nonpreferred uses of court
175
records. Can courts go further and require that their records not be
modified, posted online, or aggregated with other personal information?
Can courts restrict commercial uses of their records? Court records hold
great value to many commercial enterprises, and we can expect that
commercial users of court records will vigorously oppose any such restrictions.
The Supreme Court has not directly answered these questions, but
we can draw several conclusions from the Court’s extensive body of First
Amendment jurisprudence that address the government’s ability to control the dissemination of lawfully acquired information. First, it is unlikely that the courts can restrict or punish the dissemination of information
contained in publicly available court records. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the First Amendment protects the right to publish
practical matter, many courts do reserve seats in the courtroom for credential journalists. See, e.g.,
TIMOTHY R. MURPHY ET AL., NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, MANAGING NOTORIOUS TRIALS 44–
47 (1998) (“Generally, one-fourth to one half of the seats in a courtroom are reserved for the media,
with the rest of the space allocated between the parties and the public.”); SUPREME COURT PUB. INFO.
OFFICE, REQUIREMENTS AND PROCEDURES FOR ISSUING SUPREME COURT PRESS CREDENTIALS 1
(2015) (“The Courtroom has a limited number of seats set aside exclusively for the media . . . .”).
173. See PACER, https://www.pacer.gov/ (last visited June 20, 2017).
174. See, e.g., Jackson v. Mobley, 47 So. 590, 593 (Ala. 1908); Werfel v. Fitzgerald, 260 N.Y.S.2d
791, 798 (1965); State ex rel. Journal Co. v. Cty. Court, 168 N.W.2d 836, 841 (Wis. 1969); COLO.
JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 2.00 (2006); IND. ADMINISTRATIVE R. 9(B),
cmt.
175. See ALASKA R. ADMINISTRATION 37.8(b)(4) (prohibiting bulk distribution of records except
for scholarly or governmental purposes); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-72-305.5 (2016) (prohibiting use of
“[r]ecords of official actions and criminal justice records” for commercial solicitation); IDAHO R.
ADMINISTRATION 32(e) (allowing bulk access only for scholarly, journalistic, political, governmental,
research, evaluation, or statistical purposes); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 45-230 (2016) (prohibiting use of
names and addresses collected from public records “for the purpose of selling or offering for sale any
property or service”); 2 WASH. PRACTICE, RULES PRACTICE Gr 31(g) (7th ed.) (“The use of court records, distributed in bulk form, for the purpose of commercial solicitation of individuals named in the
court records is prohibited.”). Most states, however, appear to be agnostic as to how their records are
used. See, e.g., CAL. RULES OF COURT 10.500(e)(4); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO
COURT RECORDS § 2.00(a)(4); MO. SUPREME COURT OPERATING R. 2.03(j)(4). The federal courts
also currently do not limit the uses of court records.
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lawfully acquired information about matters of public concern. If the
government seeks to punish the publication of such information, it must
177
show a state interest “of the highest order.” Moreover, this protection
is not lost even if the information was inadvertently disclosed or was illegally acquired in the first place, so long as the publisher was not involved
178
in the initial illegality.
In Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, for example, the Court addressed whether a television broadcaster could face liability for disclosing the name of a deceased rape victim in violation of Georgia’s rape
179
shield statute. In a unanimous decision rejecting the victim’s privacy
180
claim, Justice Byron White noted that the station’s reporter had acquired the name of the victim from court testimony and records—namely
the state’s rape and murder indictments, which were publicly available at
181
the courthouse. Although the Court was sympathetic to the plaintiff’s
182
privacy claims, it held that “the interests in privacy fade when the in183
formation involved already appears on the public record.” As Justice
White reasoned:
Public records by their very nature are of interest to those concerned with the administration of government, and a public benefit
is performed by the reporting of the true contents of the records by
the media. The freedom of the press to publish that information appears to us to be of critical importance to our type of government in
which the citizenry is the final judge of the proper conduct of public
184
business.
If the Court had held otherwise—that a publisher could be liable for
disclosing a rape victim’s name that appears in public court records—this
would have a chilling effect on the coverage of court cases, an outcome
that Justice White noted was a concern for the Court:
Such a rule would make it very difficult for the media to inform citizens about the public business and yet stay within the law. The rule
would invite timidity and self-censorship and very likely lead to the
suppression of many items that would otherwise be published and
176

176. See, e.g., Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 534 (2001); Florida Star v. B.J.F., 491 U.S. 524,
526 (1989); Smith v. Daily Mail Publ’g Co., 443 U.S. 97, 106 (1979); Cox Broad. Corp. v. Cohn, 420
U.S. 469, 496 (1975).
177. Bartnicki, 532 U.S. at 528.
178. See id. at 525 (holding that an illegally taped telephone conversation was lawfully acquired
information as to the radio station and the individual to whom it was anonymously supplied); Florida
Star, 491 U.S. at 526 (refusing to hold a newspaper liable for publishing a rape victim’s name even
though the sheriff’s department inadvertently released the name); Landmark Communc’ns, Inc. v.
Virginia, 435 U.S. 829, 845–46 (1978) (holding that a newspaper could not be fined for naming a judge
who was being investigated by a judicial commission even though information was illegally leaked).
179. 420 U.S. 469, 471–72 (1975).
180. Justice Rehnquist filed a dissenting opinion stating that he would dismiss the appeal for want
of jurisdiction. Id. at 501.
181. Id. at 472–73.
182. See id. at 487 (“[P]owerful arguments can be made, and have been made, that however it
may be ultimately defined, there is a zone of privacy surrounding every individual, a zone within which
the State may protect him from intrusion by the press, with all its attendant publicity.”).
183. Id. at 494–95.
184. Id. at 495.
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that should be made available to the public. At the very least, the
First and Fourteenth Amendments will not allow exposing the press
to liability for truthfully publishing information released to the pub185
lic in official court records.
As a result, the Court in Cox Broadcasting put the burden squarely
on the government to keep sensitive information out of a court’s files in
the first place, instructing that “[i]f there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which
186
avoid public documentation or other exposure of private information.”
Once such information is disclosed in a court’s records, the state bears a
187
very heavy burden in restricting its dissemination.
Notwithstanding the First Amendment’s protections for the dissemination of information in court records, can courts impose restrictions on
the use of court records as a condition of access to the records in the first
place? The Constitution typically does not permit the government to
grant a benefit on the precondition that the beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may withhold that benefit alto188
gether. Under what is known as the “unconstitutional conditions doc189
trine,” the government cannot, for example: condition the receipt of
190
public funds on the acceptance of content-based restrictions on speech;
permit the placement of news racks on public property on the condition
191
that the publications not contain advertising; or provide tax exemptions
only for newspapers and other publications that contain certain types of
192
content. Although the Supreme Court has never addressed the question of whether the government can require requesters to sign speech185. Id. at 496.
186. Id.
187. It is also unlikely that courts will be able to enjoin the publication of information contained
in publicly available court records. See Okla. Publ’g Co. v. Dist. Court, 430 U.S. 308, 309 (1977) (striking down a pretrial order that enjoined news media from publishing the name or picture of a child);
Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539, 570 (1976) (invalidating an order prohibiting publication or
broadcast of accounts of confessions or admissions made by a criminal defendant and noting that prior
restraints bear a “heavy presumption” against their constitutional validity).
188. See, e.g., Agency for Int’l Dev. v. All. for Open Soc’y Int’l, Inc., 133 S. Ct. 2321, 2332 (2013);
City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410, 427–28 (1993); Ark. Writers’ Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 230–31 (1987); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963). There are several exceptions to this general rule, including restrictions on the speech of government employees and
the ever-growing government speech doctrine, but they are not relevant here. See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173 (1991); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
189. See, e.g., Kathleen M. Sullivan, Unconstitutional Conditions, 102 HARV. L. REV. 1413, 1415
(1989).
190. See Agency for Int’l Dev., 133 S. Ct. at 2332 (holding that a requirement that nongovernmental organizations institute an explicit anti-prostitution policy in order to receive federal funding violated the First Amendment); FCC v. League of Women Voters of Cal., 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (invalidating a statute that forbade any noncommercial educational station that received a grant from the
Corporation for Public Broadcasting from “engag[ing] in editorializing”). But see Regan v. Taxation
with Representation of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 551 (1983) (upholding a statute that allowed nonprofits to
receive tax-deductible contributions only if they abstained from lobbying).
191. See Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. at 427–28 (holding that a content-based regulation of
the placement of news racks was subject to First Amendment scrutiny).
192. See Arkansas Writers’ Project, 481 U.S. at 224, 230–31 (holding a state sales tax scheme that
provided exemption only for newspapers and “religious, professional, trade, and sports journals and/or
publications printed and published within this State” unconstitutional).
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restrictive contracts as a condition of accessing government information,
a majority of the Justices have cast doubt on the constitutionality of such
a practice.
In Los Angeles Police Department v. United Reporting Publishing
Corp., a commercial data broker challenged a California statute that imposed two restrictions on the use of arrestee addresses held by the Los
Angeles Police Department: that the person requesting an address declare that the request is being made for one of five prescribed purposes
and that the requester also declare that the address will not be used di193
rectly or indirectly to sell a product or service. In dismissing the publisher’s First Amendment claim, Chief Justice Rehnquist noted that the
company never attempted to qualify for the records and did not advance
194
the argument that its own First Amendment rights were infringed. Instead, United Reporting mounted a facial attack on the statute, which
Rehnquist rejected, concluding that the public enjoys no general right to
195
information held by the police department. Yet, a close reading of the
concurring and dissenting opinions reveals that eight Justices were in
agreement that the First Amendment would limit California’s freedom to
decide how to distribute the information if the state had decided to make
196
it available to some members of the public. As Justice Scalia remarked
in his concurrence, “a restriction upon access that allows access to the
press . . . but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use
the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction up197
on speech.”
Conditioning access to court records on how they are to be used
would be even more troubling than conditioning access to police records
because the public has a presumptive right of access to court records under the First Amendment. Moreover, given the concern evidenced by
eight of the Justices in United Reporting, as well as the Court’s longstanding aversion to allowing the government to condition the grant of a benefit on the relinquishment of a right to equal treatment, it is unlikely that
the government can, without demonstrating compelling reasons for doing
so, provide access to court records to some members of the public and
193. 528 U.S. 32, 35 (1999).
194. Id. at 40.
195. Id. (“For purposes of assessing the propriety of a facial invalidation, what we have before us
is nothing more than a governmental denial of access to information in its possession.”). For more on
how the Supreme Court’s decision in United Reporting deviates from the Court’s First Amendment
access jurisprudence, see Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 849–50.
196. See United Reporting, 528 U.S. at 42 (Scalia, J., concurring) (“[A] restriction upon access that
allows access to the press . . . but at the same time denies access to persons who wish to use the information for certain speech purposes, is in reality a restriction upon speech.”); id. at 43 (Ginsburg, J.,
joined by O’Conner, Souter, and Breyer, JJ., concurring) (“[T]he provision of [government] information is a kind of subsidy to people who wish to speak [about certain subjects,] and once a State decides to make such a benefit available to the public, there are no doubt limits to its freedom to decide
how that benefit will be distributed.”); id. at 46 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“[B]ecause the State’s discrimination is based on its desire to prevent the information from being used for constitutionally protected purposes . . . it must assume the burden of justifying its conduct.”).
197. Id. at 42 (emphasis in original).
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not others based on how they plan to use the records. Indeed, a number
of lower courts have held that restrictions on the use of government records—even when there is no right of public access in the first place—do
198
trigger First Amendment scrutiny. The few courts that have held otherwise seem to have taken the decision in United Reporting too far in
concluding that anytime there is no First Amendment right of access to a
government record, the government can freely discriminate with regard
199
to how the record is used.
Given the conclusion that restrictions on the use of court records
must survive strict scrutiny, those seeking to impose conditions on access
might instead argue that limitations on the use of court records are merely restrictions on conduct, rather than speech, and are therefore not subject to First Amendment scrutiny at all. Such an argument, however, is
unlikely to be successful.
In Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., the Supreme Court invalidated a
Vermont statute that restricted the sale, disclosure, and use of pharmacy
200
records that revealed the prescribing practices of individual doctors. In
an effort to avoid First Amendment scrutiny, Vermont asserted that the
statute did not restrict speech but simply regulated access to the infor201
mation. Noting that the state’s argument “finds some support in Los
202
Angeles Police Dept. v. United Reporting Publishing Corp.,”
Justice
198. See, e.g., Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colo., 21 F.3d 1508, 1513 (10th Cir. 1994) (finding
that the First Amendment was implicated by a statute that restricted the use of criminal justice records
because the state “disallow[ed] the release of records to those wishing to use them for commercial
speech, while allowing the release of the same records to those having a noncommercial purpose”);
Speer v. Miller, 15 F.3d 1007, 1010 (11th Cir. 1994) (holding that “[a] first amendment challenge is appropriate where a state prohibits the use of public records by one who wishes to engage in nonmisleading, truthful commercial speech”); Innovative Database Sys. v. Morales, 990 F.2d 217, 222 (5th
Cir. 1993) (striking down a statute that restricted access to crime victim and motor vehicle accident
information for commercial solicitation purposes); Legi–Tech, Inc. v. Keiper, 766 F.2d 728, 731 (2d
Cir. 1985) (holding a statute unconstitutional that permitted the general public to access a statemaintained database of pending legislation but denied such access to “those entities which offer for
sale the services of an electronic information retrieval system which contains data relating to the proceedings of the legislature”); Babkes v. Satz, 944 F. Supp. 909, 913 (S.D. Fla. 1996) (holding that a
statute that restricted commercial use of names and addresses on traffic citations violated the First
Amendment); Mahan v. Nat’l Conservative Political Action Comm., 315 S.E.2d 829, 835 (Va. 1984)
(declaring unconstitutional a statute that restricted the entities entitled to obtain copies of statewide
list of registered voters).
199. See Spottsville v. Barnes, 135 F. Supp. 2d 1316, 1323 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (finding that the First
Amendment was not implicated by a statute that restricted access to motor vehicle accident reports for
commercial solicitation because “there is no First Amendment right of access to public information”);
Walker v. S.C. Dep’t of Highways & Pub. Transp., 466 S.E.2d 346, 348 (S.C. 1995) (holding that the
First Amendment was not implicated by a statute prohibiting disclosure of motor vehicle accident reports if sought for commercial solicitation purposes because the public has no right to reports).
200. 564 U.S. 552, 557 (2011). The statute at issue stated in relevant part that “[p]harmaceutical
manufacturers and pharmaceutical marketers shall not use prescriber-identifiable information for
marketing or promoting a prescription drug unless the prescriber consents . . . .” VT. STAT. ANN. tit.
18, § 4631(d) (2011), invalidated by Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 557. The statute contained a number of exceptions for healthcare research, enforcing compliance with insurance formularies, care-management educational communications sent to patients about their conditions, law enforcement operations, and
other purposes provided by law. Id. § 4631(e).
201. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 567.
202. Id. at 568 (citing L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32 (1999)).
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Anthony Kennedy, writing for the six-Justice majority, distinguished that
case on two grounds. First, he noted that the Vermont statute imposed a
restriction not only on the government’s disclosure of the information
but also on private pharmacies that wished to distribute the infor203
mation. Second, and “more important[ly],” Kennedy concluded that
the statute’s restrictions on access to the information burdened the
speech of drug companies and data miners who sought to make use of
204
the covered information.
This second point warrants additional exploration because it gets to
the heart of the question we are trying to answer: whether the government can condition access to court records on the agreement that they be
used only for certain purposes. Sorrell casts significant doubt on the argument that such a requirement would be considered a restriction on
conduct rather than speech. In rejecting Vermont’s claim that the statute
should not be subjected to any First Amendment scrutiny, Kennedy
scoffed at the idea that the prescriber-identifying information was “a
mere ‘commodity’ with no greater entitlement to First Amendment pro205
tection than ‘beef jerky[.]’” According to Kennedy:
This Court has held that the creation and dissemination of information are speech within the meaning of the First Amendment.
Facts, after all, are the beginning point for much of the speech that
is most essential to advance human knowledge and to conduct human affairs. There is thus a strong argument that prescriber206
identifying information is speech for First Amendment purposes.
Although Kennedy ultimately concluded that the Court need not
resolve the question of whether the prescriber-identifying information at
issue in Sorrell was “speech” because Vermont’s restrictions on the use
of the information in marketing triggered First Amendment scrutiny in
207
any event, the Court’s suggestion in Sorrell that restrictions on access
to information, standing alone, implicate the First Amendment’s speech
protections is significant.
Indeed, this question has long been a point of contention for schol208
209
ars and of confusion for many lower courts. The conclusion that limi203. Id. at 568–69.
204. Id. at 569.
205. Id. at 570 (quoting IMS Health Inc. v. Ayotte, 550 F.3d 42, 52–53 (1st Cir. 2008), abrogated
by Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552 (2011)).
206. Id. (quoting Bartnicki v. Vopper, 532 U.S. 514, 527 (2001)) (“[I]f the acts of ‘disclosing’ and
‘publishing’ information do not constitute speech, it is hard to imagine what does fall within that category, as distinct from the category of expressive conduct.”) (internal citations omitted).
207. Id. at 571. Kennedy determined that the statute was a speaker- and content-based restriction
on speech because it singled out a specific class of speakers (pharmaceutical companies) and certain
uses of the information (product marketing) for disfavored treatment. Id. at 563–64. Other entities and
individuals, including those who planned to engage in “educational communications” were permitted
to use the pharmacy records. Id. at 564.
208. Compare, e.g., Jane Bambauer, Is Data Speech?, 66 STAN. L. REV. 57, 63 (2014) (“[F]or all
practical purposes, and in every context relevant to the current debates in information law, data is
speech. Privacy regulations are rarely incidental burdens to knowledge. Instead, they are deliberately
designed to disrupt knowledge creation.”), and Eugene Volokh, Freedom of Speech and Information
Privacy: The Troubling Implications of a Right to Stop People From Speaking About You, 52 STAN. L.
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tations on access to information do not burden speech would effectively
free the government to impose almost any restrictions on access to government information; conversely, the conclusion that restrictions on access to government information do burden speech and thus trigger First
Amendment scrutiny will sharply limit the extent to which the govern210
ment can restrict access. It is unlikely that Sorrell will end the debate
on this point, but it adds support to the view that government restrictions
on access to information can implicate the First Amendment regardless
of whether the public enjoys a general right of access to the information
in the first place.
Some scholars have also argued that, because commercial speech
receives lesser protection under the First Amendment, the courts have
211
more leeway to prohibit commercial uses of government records. The
Court’s decision in Sorrell, however, indicates that the government must
still meet a very high standard to restrict even commercial uses of information. Without resolving whether the Vermont statute burdened more
than just commercial speech, and thus should be subject to strict scruti212
ny, Justice Kennedy concluded that, even under intermediate scrutiny,
213
the statute could not pass constitutional muster. Kennedy’s suggestion
REV. 1049, 1050–51 (2000) (concluding that the First Amendment “generally bars the government
from controlling the communication of information,” and that “information privacy rules are not easily defensible under existing free speech law”), with Julie E. Cohen, Examined Lives: Informational
Privacy and the Subject as Object, 52 STAN. L. REV. 1373, 1414 (2000) (“In the sense that counts for
First Amendment purposes, personally-identified data is not collected, used or sold for its expressive
content at all; it is a tool for processing people, not a vehicle for injecting communication into the
‘marketplace of ideas.’”), and Neil M. Richards, Reconciling Data Privacy and the First Amendment, 52
UCLA L. REV. 1149, 1166 (2005) (arguing that “most data privacy regulations in the form of a ‘code of
fair information practices’ have nothing to do with free speech under anyone’s definition”).
209. Compare Ayotte, 550 F.3d at 52–53 (finding a statute that regulated the disclosure of prescriber-identifying information to be “principally regulat[ing] conduct, and to the extent that the challenged portions impinge at all upon speech, that speech is of scant societal value”), with Universal City
Studios, Inc. v. Corley, 273 F.3d 429, 446 (2d Cir. 2001) (“[E]ven dry information, devoid of advocacy,
political relevance, or artistic expression, has been accorded First Amendment protection.”).
210. See Neil M. Richards, Why Data Privacy Law Is (Mostly) Constitutional, 56 WM. & MARY L.
REV. 1501, 1522 (2015) (“If data were speech, every restriction on the disclosure—not to mention the
collection or use—of information would face heightened First Amendment scrutiny, and would be
presumptively unconstitutional.”); Daniel J. Solove, The Virtues of Knowing Less: Justifying Privacy
Protections Against Disclosure, 53 DUKE L.J. 967, 976–1032 (2003) (noting that “speech” is very difficult to define and discussing the various approaches to resolving this issue in the context of privacy
regulation).
211. See Brian N. Larson & Genelle I. Belmas, Second Class for the Second Time: How the Commercial Speech Doctrine Stigmatizes Commercial Use of Aggregated Public Records, 58 S.C. L. REV.
935, 978 (2007); Miriam Marcowitz-Bitton, Commercializing Public Sector Information, 97 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 412, 437–38 (2015).
212. Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 571 (“[T]he outcome is the same whether a special commercial speech
inquiry or a stricter form of judicial scrutiny is applied. . . . [T]here is no need to determine whether all
speech hampered by [the statute] is commercial, as our cases have used that term.”).
213. Id. at 572 (requiring that the statute “directly advances a substantial governmental interest
and that the measure is drawn to achieve that interest”). Kennedy concluded that Vermont’s asserted
interest in protecting the privacy of physicians could not justify the restrictions because the statute
permitted disclosure of prescriber-identifying information for any purpose other than marketing, so
the law did not actually advance the goal of protecting privacy. Id. at 572–73. The Court also rejected
Vermont’s assertion that the statute advanced the state’s goal of reducing the cost of medical services
by pushing doctors to prescribe more generic drugs, finding that such a paternalistic effort to shield
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that commercial speech restrictions always trigger some form of “height214
ened scrutiny” has prompted some scholars to conclude that Sorrell
blurred the distinction between fully protected expression and “lesser215
value” commercial speech.
Whether the Court will continue to vigorously scrutinize all commercial-speech restrictions remains an open question, but many commentators view the Sorrell decision as emblematic of the Court’s more
216
searching review of government restrictions on commercial speech.
How the courts treat commercial uses of government information has
particular importance for court access because most court records—
indeed, the vast majority of government records as a whole—are ac217
quired by commercial resellers. It was, therefore, no coincidence that
the complaining parties in Sorrell and United Reporting were data bro218
kers.
Although at least one lower court has upheld restrictions on the
219
commercial use of court records, it is unclear whether that decision will
stand up to the Court’s more searching review of commercial speech restrictions after Sorrell. In Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colorado, the
Tenth Circuit upheld a state statute that disallowed the release of criminal justice records to those wishing to use them for the purpose of soliciting business or pecuniary gain while allowing the release of the same
220
records to others. Concluding that the statute only disadvantaged
commercial speech, the court stated that its “review is conducted subject
221
to the lesser First Amendment protection afforded such speech.”
listeners from truthful, nonmisleading information was “incompatible with the First Amendment.” Id.
at 577.
214. Id. at 566. Justice Breyer, joined by Justices Kagan and Ginsburg, dissented on the application of a heightened standard of scrutiny to what he considered to be merely economic regulation that
had only an incidental effect on speech. Id. at 585 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
215. See Ashutosh Bhagwat, Sorrell v. IMS Health: Details, Detailing, and the Death of Privacy, 36
VT. L. REV. 855, 858 (2012) (“[In Sorrell,] the Court blurred the distinction between strict and intermediate scrutiny; a blurring that suggests a willingness (at least among the six Justices in the majority)
to reconsider the treatment of commercial speech as a category of lower-value, less-protected
speech.”); Nat Stern & Mark Joseph Stern, Advancing an Adaptive Standard of Strict Scrutiny for Content-Based Commercial Speech Regulation, 47 U. RICH. L. REV. 1171, 1186 (2013) (“This nearconvergence [in Sorrell] can be detected not only in the Court’s intolerance of restrictions on truthful,
nonmisleading commercial speech, but also in the pronouncements that accompany these decisions.”).
216. See, e.g., Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 858 (“[In Sorrell,] the Court stringently applied the
Central Hudson intermediate scrutiny test, an approach consistent with other recent decisions.”); Stern
& Stern, supra note 215, at 1186 (“[Sorrell] highlights a central theme of the Court’s commercial
speech jurisprudence: the narrowing gap between the principles that govern fully protected speech and
those peculiar to commercial expression.”).
217. See generally supra note 76 and accompanying text.
218. See Sorrell, 564 U.S. at 561 (noting that several of the petitioners were, in the Court’s words,
“Vermont data miners”); L.A. Police Dep’t v. United Reporting Publ’g Corp., 528 U.S. 32, 34 (1999)
(“United Reporting Publishing Corporation . . . is a private publishing service that provides the names
and addresses of recently arrested individuals to its customers, who include attorneys, insurance companies, drug and alcohol counselors, and driving schools.”).
219. See Lanphere & Urbaniak v. State of Colo., 21 F.3d 1508, 1516 (10th Cir. 1994).
220. Id. at 1510 n.1 (defining “criminal justice records” to include all papers and other documentary materials that are made, maintained, or kept by any criminal justice agency, including any court
with criminal jurisdiction, for use in the exercise of functions required or authorized by law).
221. Id. at 1513–14.
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Applying the test from Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
222
Public Service Commission, the Tenth Circuit found that Colorado had
a “substantial interest” in protecting the privacy of those charged with
223
misdemeanor traffic offenses and DUIs. In doing so, the Tenth Circuit
had to navigate around the Supreme Court’s decision in Shapero v. Kentucky Bar Association, where the Court held that recipients of direct-mail
solicitations did not have a privacy interest in avoiding attorney solicita224
tions. The Tenth Circuit distinguished Shapero on the grounds that the
Colorado statute protected the privacy interests of its citizens by preventing lawyers from snooping around in citizens’ legal affairs, regardless of
225
whether the lawyers sent solicitations.
The Colorado statute, however, did not prohibit anyone else from
accessing the information or restrict the media from reporting the charges, which seems to undercut the state’s assertion that its goal in passing
the statute was to protect the privacy of those charged with traffic viola226
tions or DUIs. Conceding that this might make the state’s asserted privacy interest “chimerical,” the Tenth Circuit reasoned that:
[E]ven if the information is available to some degree through other
sources, the state’s interest in not aiding in the dissemination of the
information for commercial purposes remains. We presume that
plaintiffs would not be involved in this litigation if the information
they seek is so widely available that the privacy of the accused is no
longer at issue. Thus, in this case we agree with the State that priva227
cy considerations constitute a substantial state interest.
The Tenth Circuit is undoubtedly correct that the Colorado statute
will reduce, at least in some instances, the dissemination of the targeted
information. It is not clear, however, how the commercial uses restricted
by the statute are sufficiently different from the permitted uses. If the argument is that state restrictions on access to information always directly
advance a substantial interest in privacy simply because they limit public
disclosure in some incremental way, such an approach would vindicate
every restriction on access to information. The Supreme Court’s apparent rejection of this argument in Sorrell indicates that commercial speech
222. 447 U.S. 557 (1980).
223. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1516. The Tenth Circuit also concluded that the statute
“advance[d] the State’s interests in a reasonably direct way” and that it was no more extensive than
necessary to serve the state’s interest. Id. at 1515.
224. 486 U.S. 466 (1988). This aspect of the Court’s decision in Shapero appears to have been
called into question by Florida Bar v. Went For It, Inc., where the Court held that the state has a “substantial interest in protecting the privacy and tranquility of personal injury victims and their loved ones
against intrusive, unsolicited contact by lawyers.” 515 U.S. 618, 624 (1995).
225. Lanphere & Urbaniak, 21 F.3d at 1514 (“Solicitors are attempting to discover individuals’
legal affairs where such discovery might be most offensive—where it is by those whose purpose it is to
use the information for pecuniary gain.”).
226. The dissent made this very point. See id. at 1518 (Aldisert, J., dissenting) (“The State’s interest in preserving the right of privacy of those arrested for driving under the influence is not so compelling that they have attempted to prohibit the publication of the names of these individuals in the El
Paso County News.”)
227. Id. at 1514.

1422

UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 2017

restrictions must be based on something more in to justify the re228
strictions.
Proponents of commercial speech restrictions thus face a catch-22:
in order to avoid strict scrutiny they must target only commercial uses of
information, but by limiting only a subset of uses (i.e., particular commercial uses of the information), they are left open to the argument that
the restrictions are ineffective in advancing privacy interests. The argument for limiting commercial uses of court information thus turns on
whether the restricted commercial uses cause greater privacy harms than
the unrestricted uses. How the courts resolve this inherent tension in the
commercial-speech doctrine will likely have a significant impact on
whether commercial uses of court records can be restricted.
In summary, although the Supreme Court has not directly addressed
the question of whether courts may limit who can access court records,
the weight of authority supports the conclusion that the First Amendment requires courts to provide access to court records on an equal basis
to all who request them. Unless a court can show a compelling reason for
doing so, it cannot discriminate between members of the public when it
comes to accessing court records. The courts may have more discretion,
however, to limit commercial uses of court records—the Supreme Court
generally subjects such restrictions to a lower standard of scrutiny. Nevertheless, privacy proponents will need to show that the commercial uses
they target have a more detrimental effect on privacy than noncommercial uses.
B.

Limits on What Records Are Accessible to the Public

While the courts have not been active in limiting who can access
court records, they—as well as many legislatures—have been much more
assertive in imposing restrictions on what the public can access. This section begins by examining which records are subject to a right of access
under the First Amendment and then considers the types of records and
information the courts can justifiably exclude from public inspection.
1.

The First Amendment’s Reach

A court’s file for a single case may consist of thousands of documents, including motions, pleadings, briefs, transcripts, exhibits entered
into evidence, and materials produced during pre-trial discovery that
have been filed with the court. In addition, judges have their own files, as
do other court personnel, they use for court administration and other
nonadjudicatory purposes. Given the wide range of records possessed by
228. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 572 (2011) (concluding that Vermont’s interest
in preserving the confidentiality of prescriber-identifying information was not advanced by the statute
because “[u]nder Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with anyone for any reason save one: They must not allow the information to be used for marketing”).
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the courts, the public cannot have a right to inspect every document in
the nation’s courthouses.
In order to determine whether a First Amendment right of access
attaches to a particular record, courts typically apply what is known as
229
the “experience and logic” test. Under this two-part test, courts ask
“whether the place and process have historically been open to the press
and general public” (the “experience” prong) and “whether public access
plays a significant positive role in the functioning of the particular pro230
cess in question” (the “logic” prong). If these criteria are met, a First
Amendment right of access attaches to the proceeding or record in question, and access can be denied only if the justifications for closure with231
stand strict scrutiny. Even if the experience and logic test is not satisfied, a common law right of access can still attach to the record in
232
question.
As the wording of the experience and logic test suggests, it was developed in the context of court proceedings, not court records. As a
threshold test for determining whether a First Amendment right of access attaches to a specific court record, the experience and logic test has
proven to be a poor fit. First, the lower courts exhibit a great deal of confusion with regard to how to actually apply the test to court records. For
example, some courts ask whether the judicial proceeding the record is
233
associated with passes the experience and logic test, while other courts
234
apply the test to the court record itself. In fact, several federal circuits
235
cannot seem to make up their minds and apply both approaches. Because of the different approaches courts take regarding the experience
and logic test, it is possible for a court proceeding to be subject to a First
Amendment right of access—with the attendant requirement that restrictions on public access must pass strict scrutiny—while the documents
associated with that proceeding would not be subject to a constitutional
236
right of access. Of course, the converse situation, in which a court ap229. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 9 (1986).
230. Id. at 8 (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 605).
231. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 510 (citing Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 606–07).
232. See Wash. Legal Found. v. U.S. Sentencing Comm’n, 89 F.3d 897, 902 (D.C. Cir. 1996).
233. See, e.g., United States v. Antar, 38 F.3d 1348, 1358–60 (3d Cir. 1994); United States v. Haller, 837 F.2d 84, 87 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Applications of NBC, 828 F.2d 340, 342 (6th Cir. 1987); In re
Wash. Post Co., 807 F.2d 383, 389–90 (4th Cir. 1986).
234. See, e.g., Wash. Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 288 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Oregonian Publ’g Co. v.
U.S. Dist. Court, 920 F.2d 1462, 1466 (9th Cir. 1990); United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 229 (7th
Cir. 1989); In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569, 573 (8th
Cir. 1988); United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985); Associated Press v. United
States Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1145 (9th Cir. 1983).
235. Compare Antar, 38 F.3d at 1359–60 (applying experience and logic test to court records),
with United States v. Smith, 776 F.2d 1104, 1111–12 (3d Cir. 1985) (applying experience and logic test
to proceeding associated with records), and Hartford Courant Co. v. Pellegrino, 380 F.3d 83, 92–96 (2d
Cir. 2004) (applying experience and logic test to court dockets), and In re N.Y. Times Co., 828 F.2d
110, 114 (2d Cir. 1987) (applying experience and logic test to proceeding associated with records).
236. See, e.g., United States v. Corbitt, 879 F.2d 224, 228–29 (7th Cir. 1989) (finding only a common-law right of access to pre-trial sentence reports despite the First Amendment right of access to
criminal proceedings); United States v. Gotti, 322 F. Supp. 2d 230, 249-50 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (recognizing First Amendment right of access to sentencing hearing but finding no right of access to presen-
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plies a First Amendment right of access to the documents but not to the
237
proceeding itself, can occur as well. This can lead to some anomalous
results that substantially undermine the public’s ability to understand the
work of the courts.
Second, and more fundamentally, the experience and logic test is
out of step with the Supreme Court’s reasoning for granting a First
238
Amendment right of access to the courts in the first place. By focusing
on “whether public access plays a significant positive role in the function239
ing of the particular process in question,” the test leaves the impression
that the First Amendment right of access rests solely on the role that
public access plays in improving the outcomes in individual cases. Yet it
makes little sense to base a First Amendment right of access on the bene240
fits that public access provides to specific court proceedings. While a
just and effective court system is undoubtedly an important public good,
241
it is not a core First Amendment value. Public access to the courts
takes on First Amendment significance because it makes self242
government possible. As the Supreme Court has repeatedly observed,
“[u]nderlying the First Amendment right of access to criminal trials is the
common understanding that ‘a major purpose of that Amendment was to
protect the free discussion of governmental affairs,’” and “to the extent
that the First Amendment embraces a right of access to criminal trials, it
is to ensure that this constitutionally protected ‘discussion of governmen243
tal affairs’ is an informed one.”
As I have argued elsewhere, the experience and logic test should be
abandoned and replaced with a test that focuses on whether the records
at issue are material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power in a
tence letters sent directly to the court); Times Herald Printing Co. v. Jones, 717 S.W.2d 933, 938–39
(Tex. App. 1986) (noting that, even if a First Amendment right of access applies to civil trials, the
“limited” common-law access right to the judicial records meant that the records could be sealed at the
court’s discretion), vacated for lack of jurisdiction, 730 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. 1987).
237. See, e.g., In re Search Warrant for Secretarial Area Outside Office of Gunn, 855 F.2d 569,
573 (8th Cir. 1988) (finding no First Amendment right of access to search warrant proceedings but
nevertheless determining that a First Amendment right attaches to documents filed in support of
search warrants); Edwards, 823 F.2d at 117-19 (finding no First Amendment right of access to mid-trial
questioning of jurors regarding potential misconduct, but holding that a right of access attached to the
transcript of the hearing); United States v. Koubriti, 252 F. Supp. 2d 424, 436 (E.D. Mich. 2003) (holding that closure of voir dire in terrorism trial did not violate First Amendment right of access so long as
transcript was released).
238. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 861–71.
239. See Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8 (emphasis added).
240. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 894.
241. Justice Stevens remarked on this very point in his concurrence in Press-Enterprise I:
The focus commanded by the First Amendment makes it appropriate to emphasize the fact that
the underpinning of our holding today is not simply the interest in effective judicial administration; the First Amendment’s concerns are much broader. The “common core purpose of assuring
freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of government,” that underlies
the decision of cases of this kind provides protection to all members of the public “from abridgment of their rights of access to information about the operation of their government, including
the Judicial Branch.” 464 U.S. at 517 (internal citations omitted).
242. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 900–02.
243. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 604–05 (1982) (quoting Mills v. Alabama, 384 U.S. 214,
218 (1966)).
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particular case. Such a test is better aligned with the justifications for
recognizing a First Amendment right of access in the first place and is
245
more workable than the experience and logic test. Indeed, assessing the
materiality of information is something that judges are well suited to
do.246
It is important to note that court records can be material even when
247
they do not relate to a dispositive issue before the court. In Center for
Auto Safety v. Chrysler Group, for example, the Ninth Circuit warned
that such a narrow approach to determining whether a right of access exists “would not include [records associated with] motions that go to the
heart of a case, such as a motion for preliminary injunction or a motion
248
in limine.” The court went on to explain:
Most litigation in a case is not literally “dispositive,” but nevertheless involves important issues and information to which our case law
demands the public should have access. To only apply the compelling reasons test to the narrow category of “dispositive motions”
goes against the long held interest “in ensuring the public’s understanding of the judicial process and of significant public events.”
Such a reading also contradicts our precedent, which presumes that
the “‘compelling reasons’ standard applies to most judicial rec249
ords.”
Instead, the Ninth Circuit held that the better test is whether the records
250
are “more than tangentially related to the underlying cause of action.”
As the court noted, “plenty of technically nondispositive motions—
including routine motions in limine—are strongly correlative to the mer251
its of a case.”
244

244. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 907. Records should be considered to be
material to a court’s exercise of its adjudicatory power whenever they are relevant to the core judicial
function of determining the facts and the law applicable to the case. Id. at 907 n.401.
245. See id. at 907–09.
246. Judges assess materiality in a wide range of contexts, including securities regulation and perjury. See Kungys v. United States, 485 U.S. 759, 770 (1988); see also THOMAS LEE HAZEN, THE LAW
OF SECURITIES REGULATION § 12 (4th ed. 2002). In fact, courts already engage in such assessments
when determining whether a common law right of access attaches to particular court records. See FTC
v. Standard Fin. Mgmt. Corp., 830 F.2d 404, 410 (1st Cir. 1987) (concluding that personal financial
statements submitted by the defendant as part of the trial court’s approval of a proposed consent decree were subject to a common-law presumption of public access because they were records on which
the trial court “relie[d] in determining the litigants’ substantive rights”); see also In re Cendant Corp.,
260 F. 3d 183, 192–93 (3d Cir. 2001); Chi. Tribune Co. v. Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 263 F.3d 1304,
1312 (11th Cir. 2001); United States v. Amodeo, 44 F.3d 141, 145–46 (2d Cir. 1995).
247. See, e.g., Ctr. for Auto Safety v. Chrysler Grp., LLC, 809 F.3d 1092, 1098 (9th Cir. 2016);
United States v. Kravetz, 706 F.3d 47, 54 (1st Cir. 2013); Romero v. Drummond Co., 480 F.3d 1234,
1245–46 (11th Cir. 2007); Leucadia, Inc. v. Applied Extrusion Tech., Inc., 998 F.2d 157, 164 (3d Cir.
1993).
248. 809 F.3d at 1098.
249. Id. (emphasis in original) (first quoting Kamakana v. City & Cty. of Honolulu, 447 F.3d 1172,
1179 (9th Cir. 2006); then quoting Pintos v. Pac. Creditors Ass’n, 605 F.3d 665, 677–78 (9th Cir. 2009)).
250. Id. at 1099.
251. Id. (internal citations omitted). The court noted that “a motion in limine to admit statements
in furtherance of a conspiracy under Federal Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) will often spell out the
very conspiracy alleged in a civil RICO complaint.” Id. at 1099 n.5.
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In many situations, replacing the experience and logic test with a
materiality test will not result in a dramatic expansion of the First
252
Amendment right of access. Courts already recognize a First Amend253
ment right of access to nearly all records associated with criminal trials
as well as to a wide range of records submitted in connection with other
types of criminal proceedings, including records related to judicial dis254
255
qualification, conflicts of interest, disqualification of defense coun256
257
sel, and competency hearings.
The change will be more significant for records in civil cases, but
many courts already apply a First Amendment right of access to civil
258
records. Utilizing the same reasoning seen in criminal cases, courts apply a First Amendment right of access to records in civil cases because
they recognize that the public cannot fully understand the actions of the
courts without having contemporaneous access to the records. In Newsday LLC v. County of Nassau, for example, the Second Circuit remarked
that “[t]he transcript of a proceeding is so closely related to the ability to
attend the proceeding itself that maintaining secrecy is appropriate only
259
if closing the courtroom was appropriate.” “Based on this logic,” the
Second Circuit wrote, “we have held that the First Amendment right applies, among other things, to summary judgment motions and documents
relied upon in adjudicating them, pretrial motions and written documents
260
submitted in connection with them, and docket sheets.”
The presumption of public access would not extend, however, to unfiled discovery material or to records that are not material to a court’s
261
exercise of its adjudicatory functions in a particular case. These records
252. This is the approach taken by the American Bar Association, which has promulgated standards recommending that there should be a public right of access to “all judicial proceedings, related
documents and exhibits, and any record made thereof,” subject to specific, narrowly defined circumstances. See ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND PUBLIC DISCOURSE 8-5.2
(2013). In the commentary to an earlier version of the standards, the ABA stated that its position was
intended to conform to the Supreme Court’s recognition in Richmond Newspapers of a First Amendment-based right of access premised on the “structural design of the Constitution to guarantee a selfinformed citizenry.” ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, FAIR TRIAL AND FREE PRESS 8-3.2,
23 (3d ed. 1992) (internal quotations omitted).
253. See supra notes 112–13 and accompanying text.
254. See In re Storer Commc’ns, Inc., 828 F.2d 330, 336 (6th Cir. 1987); In re Application of NBC,
Inc., 828 F.2d 340, 343–44 (6th Cir. 1987).
255. See In re Applications of NBC, Inc., 828 F.2d at 345.
256. See United States v. Castellano, 610 F. Supp. 1151, 1167–68 (S.D.N.Y. 1985).
257. See Miami Herald Publ’g Co. v. Chappell, 403 So. 2d 1342 (Fla. App. 1981); Louisiana v.
Eaton, 483 So. 2d 651, 662 (La. App. 1986); Express News Corp. v. MacRae, 787 S.W.2d 451, 452 (Tex.
Crim. App. 1990); Soc’y of Prof’l Journalists v. Bullock, 743 P.2d 1166, 1177–80 (Utah 1987); In re
Times-World Corp., 488 S.E.2d 677, 684 (Va. App. 1997).
258. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
259. 730 F.3d 156, 165 (2d Cir. 2013); see also Doe v. Pub. Citizen, 749 F.3d 246, 272 (4th Cir.
2014) (“Because the public benefits attendant with open proceedings are compromised by delayed
disclosure of documents, we take this opportunity to underscore the caution of our precedent and emphasize that the public and press generally have a contemporaneous right of access to court documents
and proceedings when the right applies.”).
260. Newsday L.L.C., 730 F.3d at 164 (internal citations omitted).
261. Unfiled settlement materials and documents related to fees and expenses, such as filings under the Criminal Justice Act (“CJA”), also would not be covered. See United States v. Gonzales, 150

No. 5]

PRIVACY AND COURT RECORDS

1427

would continue to be subject only to a “good cause” standard for seal262
ing. Pretrial discovery that is simply exchanged between the parties, for
263
example, is not considered a public component of litigation. Nevertheless, once discovery materials have been filed with the court, a First
Amendment right of access should attach if the records are material to
264
the court’s adjudication of the parties’ claims. Thus, as a leading treatise on litigation warns, even records “designated as confidential under a
protective order . . . will lose confidential status (absent a showing of
‘most compelling’ reasons) if introduced at trial or filed in connection
265
with a motion for summary judgment.”
2.

Evaluating Privacy Interests

As noted previously, the public’s right to inspect court records is not
266
absolute. The First Amendment right of access can be overcome when
the countervailing interests supporting secrecy are sufficiently compelling. The question is whether restrictions on public access to court records that are premised on the protection of privacy can survive strict
scrutiny. Although the question of whether a specific interest will justify
restrictions on public access cannot be answered in the abstract, it is clear
from the case law that personal privacy can be a compelling interest in
certain situations. The Supreme Court has held, for example, that the
state has a compelling interest in preserving the privacy of minors who
267
testify about the details of sex crimes, and in protecting the privacy of
268
jurors who are questioned about deeply personal matters. Lower courts
have found an even broader range of interests to be compelling, including the privacy interests of juveniles in the disclosure of physical and

F.3d 1246, 1254–55 (10th Cir. 1998) (noting that the CJA voucher process is handled by the Administrative Office of the United States Courts and that “the court essentially acts in an administrative, not
a judicial, capacity when approving voucher requests and related motions for trial assistance”).
262. The “good cause” language comes from Rule 26(c)(1), which governs the issuance of protective orders in the discovery process: “[t]he court may, for good cause, issue an order to protect a party
or person from annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, or undue burden or expense.” FED. R. CIV. P.
26(c).
263. See, e.g., Seattle Times Co. v. Rhinehart, 467 U.S. 20, 33 (1984) (“[P]retrial depositions and
interrogatories are not public components of a civil trial . . . and, in general, they are conducted in private as a matter of modern practice.”).
264. See, e.g., Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc. v. Burk, 504 So. 2d 378, 383–84 (Fla. 1987) (“[O]nce a
transcribed deposition is filed with the court . . . it is open to public inspection,” but “there is no first
amendment right of public access to criminal deposition proceedings or to unfiled depositions in criminal prosecutions.”).
265. FED. JUDICIAL CTR., MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, §11.432, at *3 (4th ed. 2004),
2004 WL 258619.
266. See supra notes 139–145 and accompanying text.
267. See Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607 (“We agree with appellee that the first interest—
safeguarding the physical and psychological well-being of a minor—is a compelling one.”).
268. See Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 511 (“The jury selection process may, in some circumstances, give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply
personal matters that person has legitimate reasons for keeping out of the public domain.”).
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mental health information, of a rape victim’s sexual conduct before and
270
after his or her encounter with the defendant, of third parties identified
271
in a “psychosexual evaluation” of a criminal defendant, of women who
have had sexual relationships with a government official who was
272
charged with corruption, and of jurors who were questioned regarding
273
potential misconduct.
The Supreme Court has, however, been skeptical of the government’s use of privacy as a Trojan horse for other purposes aimed at limit274
ing the impact of speech. In Sorrell v. IMS Health, for example, the
Court wrote that the state “[a]ll but conced[es] that [the statute restricting access to prescription information] does not in itself advance confi275
dentiality interests,” and remarked that the state fell back on other interests to support the statute, such as lowering the cost of healthcare and
276
reducing the influence of drug manufacturers. As Ashutosh Bhagwat
notes, “such ancillary interests often will turn out after further consideration, as in Sorrell, to be nothing more than efforts to suppress speech because of its potentially persuasive effect; an interest the Court has re277
peatedly labeled illegitimate.” When privacy is protected for its own
sake, however, restrictions on public access are less likely to cross the
line into what the Court calls the “highly paternalistic approach” of sup278
pressing speech because of its effects on listeners.
But it should be remembered that not only must the interest in privacy be compelling; the means chosen to advance that interest must also
be narrowly tailored and effective in advancing the state’s interest. In
269

269. See United States v. Brice, 649 F.3d 793, 796–97 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (upholding trial court’s closure of material witness proceedings where public access would reveal “private and painful” information related to then-juvenile victims’ physical and mental health).
270. See People v. Bryant, 94 P.3d 624, 635–36 (Colo. 2004) (restricting access to the transcript of
proceedings addressing the prior and subsequent sexual conduct of a rape victim).
271. See State v. Densmore, 624 A.2d 1138, 1143–44 (Vt. 1993) (rejecting wholesale closure of the
document but noting that “the privacy rights of victims may be sufficient to require redaction of portions of the document”).
272. See United States v. Silver, No. 15-CR-93 (VEC), 2016 WL 1572993, at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 14,
2016).
273. See Ex parte Greenville News, 482 S.E.2d 556, 558 (S.C. 1997) (post-trial allegations of juror
misconduct during murder trial must be publicly disclosed, but jurors’ names and identifying information could be redacted to preserve juror privacy because the “conduct occurred during the jurors’
personal time while sequestered and did not involve their function as jurors”).
274. See Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc., 564 U.S. 552, 573 (2011).
275. Id. at 573; see also id. at 572 (“It may be assumed that, for many reasons, physicians have an
interest in keeping their prescription decisions confidential. But § 4631(d) is not drawn to serve that
interest. Under Vermont’s law, pharmacies may share prescriber-identifying information with anyone
for any reason save one: They must not allow the information to be used for marketing.”)
276. Id. at 575–76.
277. Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 871; see also Thompson v. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357,
374–75 (2002) (holding that reducing the persuasive impact of drug advertisements is not a legitimate
governmental interest justifying speech restrictions).
278. W. States Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. at 375; see also 44 Liquormart, Inc. v. Rhode Island, 517 U.S.
484, 503 (1996) (“[B]ans against truthful, nonmisleading commercial speech . . . usually rest solely on
the offensive assumption that the public will respond ‘irrationally’ to the truth. The First Amendment
directs us to be especially skeptical of regulations that seek to keep people in the dark for what the
government perceives to be their own good.”) (citation omitted) (emphasis removed).
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Press-Enterprise I, for example, the trial judge stated that it was closing
the voir dire proceedings to protect the defendant’s right to a fair trial
279
and the prospective jurors’ right to privacy. The Supreme Court remarked that “[t]he jury selection process may, in some circumstances,
give rise to a compelling interest of a prospective juror when interrogation touches on deeply personal matters that person has legitimate rea280
sons for keeping out of the public domain,” but nevertheless concluded
that the trial court’s closure was improper because it was “unsupported
by findings showing that an open proceeding in fact threatened those in281
terests.”
3.

Categorical Exclusions

With such a clear directive from the Supreme Court that restrictions
on public access must be preceded by on-the-record findings demonstrating that they are necessary to advance a compelling state interest, it is
surprising that many scholars argue for categorical exemptions from pub282
lic access, and that a number of statutes and court rules declare some
types of proceedings (e.g., juvenile, child abuse, and divorce proceedings)
283
be closed to the public and certain types of information (e.g., social security numbers, dates of birth, financial account numbers and names of
284
minor children) be presumptively excluded from public access.
Categorical exclusions such as these raise a number of concerns.
First, they are incompatible with the presumption of public access required by the First Amendment. The Supreme Court has repeatedly instructed that “individualized determinations are always required before
285
the right of access may be denied.” Although the protection of privacy
can be a compelling state interest that justifies restrictions on court ac286
cess, the Court has warned that closures “must be rare” and that judges
279. 464 U.S. 501, 510 (1984).
280. Id. at 511.
281. Id. at 510–11.
282.
See, e.g., Barber, supra note 36, at 118 (arguing that courts should redact all social security
numbers and other personal information that could facilitate identity theft or financial fraud); Natalie
Gomez-Velez, Internet Access to Court Records – Balancing Public Access and Privacy, 51 LOY. L.
REV. 365, 429 (2005) (recommending that courts remove from public view high-risk data elements);
Kristin A. Henderson, Lessons from Bankruptcy Court Public Records: A Conflict of Values for Law
Librarians, 23 LEGAL REFERENCE SERVS. Q. 55, 73, 76–77 (2004) (proposing redaction of information
from bankruptcy court records); Laura W. Morgan, Strengthening the Lock on the Bedroom Door: The
Case Against Access to Divorce Records Online, 17 J. AM. ACAD. MATRIMONIAL L. 45, 51, 63 (2001)
(arguing that divorce records should be presumptively private); Caren Myers Morrison, Privacy, Accountability, and the Cooperating Defendant: Towards a New Role for Internet Access to Court Records, 62 VAND. L. REV. 921, 969–78 (2009) (recommending redaction of names of cooperating defendants and other informants).
283.
See infra notes 291–302 and accompanying text.
284.
See infra notes 335–340 and accompanying text.
285.
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 608 n.20 (1982); see also, e.g., Union Oil Co. v. Leavell, 220
F.3d 562, 567 (7th Cir. 2000); Brown v. Advantage Eng’g, 960 F.2d 1013, 1016 (11th Cir. 1992); Wash.
Post v. Robinson, 935 F.2d 282, 289 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Applications of NBC, Inc. v. Presser, 828 F.2d
340, 346 (6th Cir. 1987).
286.
Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 509.
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must “determine on a case-by-case basis whether closure is necessary.”
The Court explained that “[s]uch an approach ensures that the constitutional right of [access] will not be restricted except where necessary to
288
protect the State’s interest.”
Second, categorical exclusions are constitutionally problematic because they foreclose judges from considering other options to protect
privacy, short of closure or sealing. As with other First Amendment
rights, a court must consider all reasonable alternatives before imposing
restrictions on public access. In Presley v. Georgia, the Supreme Court’s
most recent pronouncement on public access to criminal proceedings, the
Court instructed that “trial courts are required to consider alternatives to
289
closure even when they are not offered by the parties.” As the Court
noted, “[t]he public has a right to be present whether or not any party
290
has asserted the right.”
287

a. Case Exclusions
Nevertheless, some court proceedings and records are categorically
closed to the public. For example, many states have statutes that restrict
public access to records in cases that involve certain types of legal matters, including adoption, child abuse, guardianship, juvenile, and divorce
291
proceedings. Moreover, in every state, as well as in the federal court
system, grand jury proceedings are conducted under strict rules of secrecy.292
Juvenile court proceedings provide an instructive example of the
problems that arise from the categorical closure of court proceedings and
records. Each state has special courts—often called juvenile courts—that
293
have jurisdiction over cases involving children under a specified age.
287.
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609–10 (finding that the state’s interests in protecting the
privacy of minor sexual assault victims was compelling but holding that a statute that required mandatory closure was not the least restrictive means of advancing that interest); see also Press-Enterprise I,
464 U.S. at 513 (invalidating closure of jury voir dire and stating “not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requisite specificity but there was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure
and to total suppression of the transcript”).
288.
Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 609.
289.
558 U.S. 209, 214 (2010) (holding that defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a public trial
was violated when the trial court excluded the public from the voir dire of prospective jurors) (per curiam).
290.
Id.
291.
See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 12-15-133 (2012) (restricting public access to juvenile court records);
FLA. ADMIN. CODE ANN. r. 2.420(d)(1)(B) (2016) (prohibiting access to records in juvenile and adoption proceedings); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.340 (West 2016) (making all juvenile court records confidential unless otherwise ordered); MD. CODE ANN., CTS. & JUD. PROC. § 16-906 (West 2016) (listing
categories of cases in which court records are not publicly accessible in Maryland, including adoption,
guardianship, child abuse, and attorney grievance matters); MONT. CODE ANN. § 33-2-1323 (2016)
(sealing records of supervision proceedings by the insurance commissioner); id. § 41-3-205 (sealing
records of child abuse and neglect proceedings); N.Y. CRIM. PROC. LAW § 160.50 (McKinney 2016)
(sealing records in criminal cases decided in favor of the accused).
292.
See, e.g., In re N.Y. Times Co. to Unseal Wiretap & Search Warrant Materials, 577 F.3d 401,
410 n.4 (2d Cir. 2009) (“All grand jury proceedings . . . traditionally have been nonpublic.”).
293.
See Juvenile Court, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
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Juvenile courts hear a range of claims, including criminal charges against
294
minors (typically referred to as “juvenile delinquency” proceedings)
and allegations of abuse, abandonment, and neglect (“juvenile depend295
ency” proceedings). Although the experience of juveniles in delinquen296
cy proceedings often mirrors adult criminal defendants, juvenile court
proceedings are considered to be civil as opposed to criminal because
297
treatment and rehabilitation are the primary goals, not punishment.
Juvenile court proceedings, therefore, fall in the gray area between the
Supreme Court’s precedents addressing a right of access to criminal proceedings and the less well-developed right of access to civil proceedings
298
that has been recognized by many lower courts.
As a result of the uncertainty over whether the First Amendment
right of access reaches juvenile proceedings, a number of states have
statutes that impose full or partial bans on public access to juvenile pro299
ceedings and records. In fact, many of these statutes leave judges with
no discretion to allow public access, even if they feel that public access is
warranted or that it is in the juvenile’s best interests. In Vermont, for example, the state’s supreme court has held that its juvenile shield law re300
quires the mandatory closure of all juvenile court proceedings. Similarly, in Kentucky the public is excluded from both juvenile dependency
301
and delinquency proceedings, and the records associated with those
proceedings are considered to be confidential and may be disclosed only
302
to certain individuals and agencies designated by statute.
Although the Supreme Court has not addressed the blanket closure
of juvenile proceedings, there are reasons to doubt the constitutionality
of their per se closure. In Globe Newspaper Co. v. Superior Court, the
Court did consider whether the First Amendment permits a statutory bar
to public access to criminal trials during the testimony of minor victims of
303
sex crimes. The appellee argued that the statute served two compelling
state interests: “the protection of minor victims of sex crimes from fur294.
See Juvenile Delinquency, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
295.
See Shelter Hearing, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
296.
See generally Gordon A. Martin, Jr., The Delinquent and the Juvenile Court: Is There Still a
Place for Rehabilitation?, 25 CONN. L. REV. 57 (1992).
297.
Id. at 59–60; see also United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1358 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[P]roceedings
to determine whether a juvenile is a delinquent are not generally regarded as criminal proceedings.”).
298.
See New Jersey ex rel. K.P., 709 A.2d 315, 322 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1997) (“[T]he United States
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court of New Jersey have yet to decide whether this [First Amendment] right extends to juvenile proceedings.”); In re J.S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1127 (Vt. 1981) (“[J]uvenile
proceedings are not criminal prosecutions, a fact which makes at least some of the First Amendment
purposes served by open criminal trials inapplicable.”).
299.
See KRISTEN RASMUSSEN, REPORTERS COMM. FOR FREEDOM OF THE PRESS, ACCESS TO
JUVENILE JUSTICE 4–5 (2012), http://www.rcfp.org/rcfp/orders/docs/SJAJJ.pdf (listing states that restrict public access to juvenile proceedings and records).
300.
See In re J. S., 438 A.2d 1125, 1131 (Vt. 1981) (“The juvenile shield law does not give the
court below discretion to make the proceedings public.”). The court’s holding was limited to proceedings already in juvenile court; proceedings prior to transfer to juvenile court are presumptively open in
Vermont. See In re K.F., 559 A.2d 663 (Vt. 1989).
301.
See KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 610.070 (West 2017).
302. See id. § 610.340.
303. 457 U.S. 596 (1982).
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ther trauma and embarrassment; and the encouragement of such victims
304
to come forward and testify in a truthful and credible manner.” The
Supreme Court acknowledged that both of these interests were compelling, but it held that neither would justify an across-the-board ban on access in every case involving a minor:
[A]s compelling as that interest [in protecting minor victims of sex
crimes] is, it does not justify a mandatory closure rule, for it is clear
that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the interest. A trial court can determine on a case-by-case
basis whether closure is necessary to protect the welfare of a minor
victim. Among the factors to be weighed are the minor victim’s age,
psychological maturity and understanding, the nature of the crime,
and desires of the victim, and the interests of parents and relatives.
[The Massachusetts statute], in contrast, requires closure even if the
victim does not seek the exclusion of the press and general public,
305
and would not suffer injury by their presence.
In addition to articulating specific findings justifying restrictions on
public access, a court must conclude that there are no less-restrictive al306
ternatives to closure available. Because mandatory bans on public access foreclose this inquiry, they are also constitutionally suspect. As the
Court observed in Globe Newspaper:
If the trial court had been permitted to exercise its discretion, closure might well have been deemed unnecessary. In short, [the statute] cannot be viewed as a narrowly tailored means of accommodating the State’s asserted interest: That interest could be served just as
well by requiring the trial court to determine on a case-by-case basis
whether the State’s legitimate concern for the well-being of the minor victim necessitates closure. Such an approach ensures that the
constitutional right of the press and the public to gain access to
criminal trials will not be restricted except where necessary to pro307
tect the State’s interest.
This is not to say that all proceedings and information regarding juveniles must be open to public inspection. The Court noted in Globe
Newspaper that protecting the privacy of minors can be a compelling
state interest: “In individual cases, and under appropriate circumstances,
the First Amendment does not necessarily stand as a bar to the exclusion
from the courtroom of the press and general public during the testimony
308
of minor sex-offense victims.” Indeed, lower courts have held that the
privacy interests of minors are compelling and can justify the closure of

304. Id. at 607.
305. Id. at 608 (emphasis in original).
306. Id. at 608-09; see also Press-Enterprise I, 464 U.S. at 513 (invalidating closure of jury voir dire
and stating “not only was there a failure to articulate findings with the requisite specificity but there
was also a failure to consider alternatives to closure and to total suppression of the transcript”).
307. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 607–08.
308. Id. at 611 n.27.
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court proceedings and the sealing of court records. But, as the Court
held in Globe Newspaper, “a mandatory rule, requiring no particularized
310
determinations in individual cases, is unconstitutional.”
Based in part on the Supreme Court’s decision in Globe Newspaper,
a number of courts have questioned whether the First Amendment per311
mits the blanket closure of juvenile proceedings. In In re Chase, for example, the New York Family Court held that the public has a First
312
Amendment right of access to juvenile proceedings, explaining that
public access to juvenile proceedings is especially important because it
can enhance the integrity of the proceedings and deter abuse of the judi313
cial process. In United States v. A.D., the Third Circuit rejected the
314
government’s argument that the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act re315
quires closed proceedings and records. Although the court declined to
rule on the question of whether a mandatory closure rule would violate
the First Amendment, it remarked that it was difficult to reconcile a
mandatory rule of closure with the Supreme Court’s analysis in Globe
Newspaper and intimated that, in the appropriate case, it too would find
316
a presumptive right of public access to juvenile delinquency hearings.
In order to avoid “serious First Amendment concerns,” the court held
that the statute did not impose a mandatory ban on public access, stating:
“in the absence of an unambiguous directive to the contrary, we are reluctant to attribute to Congress an intention to deprive district courts of
discretion to strike on a case-by-case basis the balance between the interests protected by the First Amendment and competing privacy inter317
ests” in juvenile delinquency cases.
Lest we think that invalidating the blanket closure of juvenile proceedings will throw the juvenile justice system into disarray, it is im309

309. See, e.g., United States v. Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d 86, 92 (1st Cir. 1995); Webster Groves Sch.
Dist. v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 898 F.2d 1371, 1375 (8th Cir. 1990); M.P. v. Schwartz, 853 F. Supp. 164, 167
(D. Md. 1994); Bell v. Shinseki, No. 1:12CV57, 2013 WL 3157569, at *9–10 (M.D.N.C. June 20, 2013);
Wittenberg ex rel. J.W. v. Winston-Salem/Forsyth Cty. Bd. of Educ., Civil Action No. 1:05cv00818,
2009 WL 1684585, at *2 (M.D.N.C. June 16, 2009); Mears v. Atl. Se. Airlines, Inc., No. 5:12-CV-613-F,
2014 WL 5018907, at *3 (E.D.N.C. Oct. 7, 2014); In re J.B., 39 A.3d 421, 427 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2012).
310. Globe Newspaper Co., 457 U.S. at 611 n.27; cf. State v. Parvin, 364 P.3d 94, 106–10 (Wash.
2015) (finding that a blanket sealing of documents in all parental termination cases violated the Washington Constitution and requiring case-by-case analysis).
311. See, e.g., Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 90; United States v. A.D., 28 F.3d 1353, 1356 (3d Cir.
1994); In re Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d 1000, 1001–04 (Fam. Ct. 1982); In re M.B., 819 A.2d 59, 60 (Pa. Super.
Ct. 2003).
312. Chase, 446 N.Y.S.2d at 1002 (“[T]he historical and analytical bases for the public right of
access in criminal trials pertain equally to civil proceedings. Those grounds reflect a profound AngloAmerican commitment to open justice in criminal and civil proceedings.”).
313. Id. at 1008.
314. 18 U.S.C. §§ 5031–5042 (2012).
315. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1356.
316. See id. at 1358; accord Three Juveniles, 61 F.3d at 90 (“Assuming arguendo that the First
Amendment right of public access does apply to some degree to juvenile proceedings, we agree that
while the Globe case is not directly applicable here, the Court’s reasoning in that case strongly suggests that the district court’s preferred [mandatory] reading of the Act raises some serious First
Amendment concerns.”).
317. A.D., 28 F.3d at 1359.
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portant to consider that thirty-eight states already recognize a right of access to juvenile delinquency proceedings, based on either the First
318
Amendment or a mix of state constitutional, common law, and statuto319
ry authority. Nineteen states currently grant a right of access to juvenile
320
dependency proceedings.
Moreover, courts must already engage in case-specific evaluations
before restricting public access in civil and criminal cases and such a system has proven to be workable for the courts in those cases.
There are also strong normative reasons to reject a mandatory bar
to public access in juvenile cases. Even though minors have long been
treated differently than adults, both to protect their privacy and to pro321
mote society’s interest in rehabilitation, some commentators have
pushed back against the lack of public access to juvenile proceedings, arguing that additional public oversight would improve the functioning of
the juvenile court system and allow the public to evaluate society’s ap322
proach to juvenile justice issues. Laura Cohen, for example, writes:
“[T]he system’s remarkable ability to escape public scrutiny has contributed to widespread ignorance about the nature of youth crime and the
shocking ineffectiveness of traditional responses to it. Rational system
reform will only come about if the public becomes better informed and
323
demands more of lawmakers.” The National Council of Juvenile and
Family Court Judges has also taken the position that juvenile proceed324
ings should generally be open to the public. These voices appear to be
resonating with judges and legislators, and the trend in courts around the
country is to allow greater public access to juvenile proceedings and their
325
associated records.
It bears repeating that the First Amendment does not require courts
to ignore the privacy interests of minors or anyone else. Even under the
most expansive application of a First Amendment right of access, a court
can still close its proceedings and restrict public access to sensitive infor318. See RASMUSSEN, supra note 299, at 4–5 (listing states).
319. See id.
320. See id.
321. See Emily Bazelon, Public Access to Juvenile and Family Court: Should the Courtroom Doors
Be Open or Closed?, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 155, 192–93 (1999).
322. See, e.g., Janet E. Ainsworth, Re-Imaging Childhood and Reconstructing the Legal Order:
The Case for Abolishing the Juvenile Court, 69 N.C. L. REV. 1083, 1120–29 (1991); Bazelon, supra note
321, at 192–93; Kathleen S. Bean, Changing the Rules: Public Access to Dependency Court, 79 DENV.
U. L. REV. 1, 54 (2001); Laura Cohen, Kids, Courts, and Cameras: New Challenges for Juvenile Defenders, 18 QUINNIPIAC L. REV. 701, 702 (1999); Steven A. Drizin & Greg Luloff, Are Juvenile Courts
A Breeding Ground for Wrongful Convictions?, 34 N. KY. L. REV. 257, 310 (2007); Jennifer L. Rosato,
Secrecy and the Juvenile Justice System: The Future of Access to the Family Court: Beyond Naming and
Blaming, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 149, 158 (2000).
323. Cohen, supra note 322, at 702.
324. See NAT’L COUNCIL OF JUVENILE & FAMILY COURT JUDGES, CHILDREN AND FAMILY
FIRST: A MANDATE FOR AMERICA’S COURTS 3 (1995) (“Traditional notions of secrecy and confidentiality should be re-examined and relaxed to promote public confidence in the court’s work. The public
has a right to know how courts deal with children and families.”).
325. See Linda Szymanski, Can Sealed Juvenile Court Records Ever Be Unsealed or Inspected?, 15
NAT’L CTR. FOR JUV. JUST. SNAPSHOT (2011); Cohen, supra note 322, at 706–09.
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mation in its records. What the First Amendment does require, however,
is that each case be evaluated based on its specific facts in order to determine whether restrictions on public access are supported by a compelling interest and are narrowly tailored to advance that interest. As the
Supreme Court observed in Globe Newspaper, “it is clear that the circumstances of the particular case may affect the significance of the inter326
est.” Statutes and rules that mandate the closure of court proceedings
and records foreclose this essential inquiry and are thus facially unconstitutional.
What are we to make, then, of grand jury secrecy? Courts uniformly
uphold restrictions on public access to grand jury proceedings, noting
327
that secrecy is an integral part of the grand jury’s function. In fact, the
Supreme Court remarked in dicta in Press-Enterprise II that grand jury
328
proceedings should remain closed. Although the dissenters in PressEnterprise II argued that the Court’s rationale for opening pretrial proceedings based on the “logic” of openness would apply equally well to
329
grand jury proceedings, the majority responded that the traditional secrecy of grand jury proceedings served to advance the grand jury’s
330
screening and investigatory functions. In contrast, the closure of preliminary hearings, the majority noted, is not done to serve the hearing’s
functional objectives, but to protect other interests, such as the accused’s
331
right to a fair trial.
Although the Supreme Court in Press-Enterprise II did not distinguish grand jury proceedings from other types of criminal proceedings on
the basis of the grand jury’s unique place in the criminal justice system,
some courts have concluded that there is no First Amendment right of
access to grand jury proceedings, not because of the inherent need for
secrecy, but because grand jury proceedings are not instituted by the ju332
diciary or governed by its rules. In United States v. Williams, the Su326. 457 U.S. 596, 608 (1982).
327. See, e.g., United States v. Index Newspapers LLC, 766 F.3d 1072, 1084 (9th Cir. 2014) (“Because the grand jury is an integral part of the criminal investigatory process, these proceedings are always held in secret.”). The public does have a right of access to the “ministerial records” of a grand
jury, which “generally relate to the procedural aspects of the impaneling and operation of the . . .
Grand Jury, as opposed to records which relate to the substance of the . . . Grand Jury’s investigation.”
In re Special Grand Jury, 674 F.2d 778, 779 n.1, 780 (9th Cir. 1982).
328. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 8–9 (“Although many governmental processes operate best
under public scrutiny, it takes little imagination to recognize that there are some kinds of government
operations that would be totally frustrated if conducted openly. A classic example is that ‘the proper
functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of grand jury proceedings.’”) (quoting
Douglas Oil Co. v. Petrol Stops Nw., 441 U.S. 211, 218 (1979)).
329. Press-Enterprise II, 478 U.S. at 26 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“The obvious defect in the
Court’s approach is that its reasoning applies to the traditionally secret grand jury with as much force
as it applies to California preliminary hearings. A grand jury indictment is just as likely to be the ‘final
step’ in a criminal proceeding and the ‘sole occasion’ for public scrutiny as is a preliminary hearing.”).
330. Id. at 9 (“[T]he proper functioning of our grand jury system depends upon the secrecy of
grand jury proceedings.”) (quoting Douglas Oil Co., 441 U.S. at 218).
331. See LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 23.1(d) (3d ed. 2000).
332. See In re Sealed Case, 199 F.3d 522, 526 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (denying request for public access
and stating “the grand jury is not even a part of the judicial system”); In re Motion of Dow Jones &
Co., 142 F.3d 496, 498–99 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (refusing to grant a right of access to ancillary proceedings
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preme Court remarked that the power to convene a grand jury is “not in
333
the body of the Constitution.” As a result, the Court concluded that
“[b]ecause the grand jury is an institution separate from the courts, over
whose functioning the courts do not preside,” the courts have no “‘supervisory’ judicial authority” to prescribe standards of prosecutorial con334
duct. Whether because grand juries operate outside of the auspices of
the judicial branch or because secrecy is integral to a grand jury’s investigatory function, it is unlikely that the mandatory closure of grand jury
proceedings will have to be rethought.
b. Record- and Information-Based Exclusions
Unlike the mandatory closure of entire cases, which occurs in a relatively small number of case types, legislatures and courts are increasingly
drafting statutes and court rules that restrict public access to specific
types of information and court records. These categorical exclusions operate at different levels of generality. Some statutes and court rules exclude from public inspection particular information types (e.g., social se335
curity numbers, bank account numbers); some exclude designated in336
information categories (e.g., juror information, witness information);
and some exclude entire classes of records (e.g., income tax returns,
337
presentence reports).
For example, in California, a state statute requires a court, upon the
request of a party to a divorce proceeding, to seal any records that contain the location or other identifying information regarding the financial
338
assets and liabilities of the parties. In Colorado, statewide court rules
identify twenty-four types of information and records that are excluded
from public access, including genetic testing information, drug and alcorelated to a grand jury investigation and noting that “[a]lthough the grand jury normally operates, of
course, in the courthouse and under judicial auspices, its institutional relationship with the Judicial
Branch has traditionally been, so to speak, at arm’s length”) (quoting United States v. Williams, 504
U.S. 36, 47 (1992)).
333. 504 U.S. 36, 47 (1992).
334. Id.
335. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(e) (financial
account numbers, social security numbers, driver license numbers, and other “personal identification
numbers”); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B)(iii) (2016) (social security; bank account; and charge, debit, and credit card numbers, among other kinds of records); KY. REV. STAT.
ANN. § 403.135(3) (West 2016) (social security numbers, names of minor children, dates of birth, or
financial account numbers in divorce or child custody proceedings); Md. R. § 16-907 (2016) (social
security numbers and federal identification numbers).
336. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d)(2) (genetic
testing information); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B)(iv) (HIV testing information);
LA. STAT. ANN. § 729.7 (2016) (identifying witnesses in criminal trials); MONT. CODE ANN. § 44-5311(3) (2016) (information identifying the victim of certain sex crimes).
337. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 3552(c) (West 2016) (tax returns); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T,
PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d) (deposited wills, presentence reports, and separation
agreements); FL. R. JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION 2.420(d)(1)(B) (presentence investigation reports,
estate inventories and accountings, and forensic behavioral health evaluations); MD. R. § 16-1006 (tax
returns, presentence reports, and autopsy reports); MONT CODE ANN. § 46-18-113 (2016) (presentence
reports).
338. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2024.6(a).
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hol treatment information, paternity tests, HIV/AIDS testing information, juror questionnaires, credit reports, medical and mental health
information, psychological and intelligence test information, and scholas339
tic achievement data. And, in the Western District of North Carolina, a
local rule prevents the public from seeing a defendant’s sentencing mem340
orandum and letters of support from interested parties. While this is
just a partial list, it reveals the wide range of categorical exclusions that
can impact public access to court records.
Although per se restrictions on public access to information held by
the government might be permissible in situations where the public does
not have a First Amendment right to access the underlying records, such
as in the FOIA context, it is not permissible when applied to court rec341
ords. Because the categorical exclusion of public access to information
in court records shares the same deficiencies as the case-based closures
described in the prior Section, a number of courts have held categorical
342
exclusions to be unconstitutional. In Burkle v. Burkle, for example, a
California court held that a state statute mandating the sealing of financial records in divorce proceedings violated the public’s First Amend343
ment right of access. In concluding that the statute at issue was “unconstitutional on its face,” the court wrote:
The First Amendment provides a right of access to court records in
divorce proceedings. While the privacy interests protected by [the
statute] may override the First Amendment right of access in an
appropriate case, the statute is not narrowly tailored to serve overriding privacy interests. Because less restrictive means exist to
achieve the statutory objective, [the statute] operates as an undue
339. See COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.60(d).
340. W.D.N.C. LOCAL R. OF CRIM. P. 32.3, 55.1(I); see also Jim Morrill & Fred Clasen-Kelly, Notable Allies Rallied Around David Petraeus, CHARLOTTE OBSERVER (June 8, 2015), http://
www.charlotteobserver.com/news/politics-government/article23542822.html (“Legal experts said sentencing memorandums and letters are routinely made public in other federal court districts. They said
they did not know any other jurisdictions in the country where the records are sealed without approval
from a judge.”).
341. See supra notes 191–95 and accompanying text.
342. See, e.g., Globe Newspaper Co. v. Pokaski, 868 F.2d 497, 510–11 (1st Cir. 1989) (holding that
“a blanket restriction on access to the records of cases ending in an acquittal, a dismissal, a nolle prosequi, or a finding of no probable cause, is unconstitutional, even if access is not denied permanently”);
Associated Press v. U.S. Dist. Court, 705 F.2d 1143, 1147 (9th Cir. 1983) (invalidating the imposition of
blanket sealing orders, which the court said “impermissibly reverse the ‘presumption of openness’ that
characterizes criminal proceedings ‘under our system of justice’”); Globe Newspaper Co. v. Fenton,
819 F.Supp. 89, 100 (D. Mass. 1993) (finding unconstitutional a statute restricting access to the courtmaintained indices of criminal defendants); Burkle v. Burkle, 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d 805, 808 (Cal. App. 4th
2006) (concluding that a state statute that required sealing of financial records in divorce proceedings
was unconstitutional); Stephen Wm. Smith, Kudzu in the Courthouse: Judgments Made in the Shade, 3
FED. CTS. L. REV. 177, 177–80 (2009) (surveying decisions that have found blanket sealing orders and
policies unconstitutional); cf. Associated Press v. New Hampshire, 153 N.H. 120, 132–37 (2005) (finding a statute that presumptively sealed financial affidavits filed in domestic relations cases unconstitutional under the state constitution); Allied Daily Newspapers v. Eikenberry, 121 Wash.2d 205, 207
(1993) (holding that a statute that automatically sealed court records of minor victims of sexual assault
violated the state constitution).
343. 37 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 808.
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burden on the First Amendment right of public access to court rec344
ords.
This is not to say that courts cannot restrict public access to specific
types of information or records in their files. Indeed, the exclusion of
personal identifiers, financial account information, and highly sensitive
345
medical information is quite common and is often fully justified. Furthermore, courts are free to exclude from public access records that are
not subject to a First Amendment right of access in the first place. Recall
that the public’s right of access does not extend to unfiled discovery material or to other records that are not material to a court’s exercise of its
346
adjudicatory functions in a particular case.
But, when a First Amendment right of access does reach the records
in question, the court must consider the specific facts of the case to assess
whether the interest in privacy is compelling. The imposition of per se
exclusions in statutes and court rules, by definition and intention, force
judges to ignore the facts of individual cases. Yet, as the Supreme Court
warned in Globe Newspaper, “the circumstances of the particular case
347
may affect the significance of the interest.” Because categorical restrictions on public access foreclose this inquiry, they do not comport
with the First Amendment. Moreover, when the restrictions on public
access to court records originate in legislative mandates, they raise po348
tential separation of powers issues for the courts. Were this not the
case, a legislature could freely decide for itself the scope of the public’s
right of access to the courts.
The case-by-case consideration of the interests supporting closure
and sealing is one of the key benefits of a right of access grounded in the
First Amendment. In some cases, restrictions on public access will turn
out to be justified, but in others, the interests supporting closure will not
344. Id. at 808; accord In re Marriage of Nicholas, 113 Cal. Rptr. 3d 629, 636 (Cal. Ct. App. 2010)
(“Since the First Amendment guarantee of public access to the courts is at stake, family law departments may close their courtrooms and seal their court records only in limited circumstances, and only
when they expressly identify the particular facts that support the existence of . . . constitutional standards.”); Barron v. Fla. Freedom Newspapers, Inc., 531 So.2d 113, 119 (Fla. 1988) (finding that medical
reports regarding a party’s physical condition were an integral part of the case and, thus, should not
have been sealed in the divorce proceeding); Ex parte Weston, No. 91-DR-23-881, 1991 WL 322233, at
*10 (S.C. Fam. Ct. Nov. 25, 1991) (“[T]he files of the Family Court should not be subject to special
shielding. The law of access to judicial records and proceedings, set forth above, must apply to this
Court as it does to others.”).
345. Of course, this depends on the specific facts of the case. See supra Subsection IV.B.2.
346. See supra notes 261–65 and accompanying text.
347. 457 U.S. at 608.
348. See Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1177 (6th Cir. 1983) (rejecting the proposition that FOIA should govern which court records can be sealed); Johnson v. Florida,
336 So.2d 93, 95 (Fla. 1976) (holding a statute that required judicial records be expunged was unconstitutional to the extent that it established a procedure for the courts); Ex parte Farley, 570 S.W.2d 617,
624 (Ky. 1978) (holding that judicial records were “inseparable from the judicial function itself, and
are not subject to statutory regulation”); Martin, supra note 11, at 862 n.29. As a consequence, court
records are exempt from FOIA and most state public-record statutes; when such laws do seem to
reach court records, courts try to construe them so as to avoid intrusion on judicial authority. See, e.g.,
Rules Comm. of Superior Court v. Freedom of Info. Comm., 472 A.2d 9, 12 (Conn. 1984); GomezVelez, supra note 282, at 427 n.188.
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be compelling or there will be a less-restrictive alternative to closure
available. Under the First Amendment, courts have an obligation to consider all reasonable alternatives to restricting public access and to choose
the least speech-restrictive option. That task cannot be delegated to the
legislature or even to rule-making bodies within the court system.
The conclusion that per se exclusions on public access are impermissible under the First Amendment will strike some readers as impractical
and profoundly out of step with current thinking about the privacy harms
that accompany the public disclosure of certain types of sensitive information, particularly social security numbers and financial account information that can lead to identity theft. The answer to these concerns,
however, is not to create exceptions to the First Amendment’s requirement that restrictions on access must be narrowly tailored and supported
by case-specific findings. Any such “watering down” of the strict scrutiny
test will undoubtedly bleed over into other areas of First Amendment
law, especially in the lower courts. As Ashutosh Bhagwat warns, “even if
one supports outcomes upholding privacy laws against First Amendment
challenges, one might pause before advocating the position that privacy
laws—which certainly protect important interests, but hardly ones fundamental to national well-being or social stability—satisfy the tradition349
ally extremely speech-protective strict scrutiny standard.” The better
approach, as discussed in Part V, is to require that courts continue to engage in case-specific analysis of the competing interests and develop rules
that keep highly sensitive information out of a court’s files in the first
350
place.
C.

Limits on the Means of Access

We now turn to the practicalities of public access. Obviously, the
First Amendment does not require instantaneous access to court records.
Court administrators must be given some leeway in designing access policies and procedures that account for the practical realities of public access. This Section will consider what the First Amendment requires with
regard to how the courts must provide public access to their records.
1.

Access at the Courthouse

Nearly all courts provide in-person access to court records at their
respective courthouses. Admittance to the building is therefore typically
a precondition for accessing court records, and “[w]hether a recordseeker needs to show identification, pass through a metal detector, or
sign in to access records depends entirely on the particular court she is
351
visiting.” Most courts provide access to the original versions of court
349.
350.
351.

Bhagwat, supra note 215, at 873–74.
See infra Section V.A.
Conley et al., supra note 2, at 789.
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records and other filed materials, which can be inspected at the courthouse but cannot be removed from the building. Courts that utilize electronic filing systems usually provide access to the records through a com353
puter terminal or kiosk in the clerk’s office. Whether the court is part
of the federal or state court system, or is a trial, appellate, or supreme
court, it ordinarily maintains records only for its own cases. Accordingly,
the times when records can be inspected, the time it takes to receive records, the number of records a requester can review at a time, and whether the records can be copied or otherwise duplicated (and any fees for
354
doing so) will depend on the policies of the particular court.
These practicalities of physical access inevitably impose some burdens on the public when accessing court records. There appears to be little reason to doubt, however, that reasonable requirements imposed on
requesters that are unrelated to the content of the records are acceptable
under the First Amendment. In Globe Newspaper, for example, the Supreme Court remarked in a footnote that “limitations on the right of access that resemble ‘time, place, and manner’ restrictions on protected
355
speech . . . would not be subjected to . . . strict scrutiny.” Deference under the “time, place, and manner test” is generally appropriate when the
restriction serves an important (or significant) governmental interest; the
interest is unrelated to the content of the information to be disclosed;
there are no less restrictive alternatives; and there are ample alternative
356
channels for communication of the information. In the context of access to court proceedings, courts have applied this test to restrictions on
the number of spectators allowed in the courtroom, the use of cameras
and recording devices, and controls on other courtroom distractions,
finding such restrictions permissible “in many instances . . . based on the
legitimate societal interest in protecting the adjudicatory process from
357
disruption.”
352

352. Access to nondocumentary evidence can sometimes involve special restrictions. See Nixon v.
Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (holding that, because the public had been able to
listen to the tapes, they had no right to physical access to the records as long as the transcripts were
made available); State v. Archuleta, 857 P.2d 234, 242 (Utah 1993) (holding that “no right exists for
the public to physically inspect tangible items of evidence admitted at a preliminary hearing unless the
court, in its discretion, deems it appropriate to allow inspection”). But see United States v. Criden, 648
F.2d 814, 815 (3d Cir. 1981) (allowing news media to copy audio and video tapes entered into evidence
and played in open court); United States v. Hernandez, 124 F. Supp. 2d 698, 706 (S.D. Fla. 2000) (ordering, on First Amendment grounds, that the public have access to trial evidence, including “all nondocumentary evidence for the limited purpose of viewing, photographing, and/or videotaping”).
353. See Hulse, supra note 76, at 17.
354. See, e.g., COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 5.00 (b) (“Court
records will be available for public access in the courthouse during hours established by the court.”).
355. 457 U.S. 596, 607 n.17 (1982); see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia, 448 U.S. 555,
581 n.18 (1980) (“[A] trial judge, in the interest of the fair administration of justice, [may] impose reasonable limitations on access to a trial.”) (plurality opinion).
356. See, e.g., Ward v. Rock Against Racism, 491 U.S. 781, 791 (1989); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. FTC, 710 F.2d 1165, 1179 (6th Cir. 1983) (citing United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367,
377 (1968)).
357. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 710 F.2d at 1179; see also Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
343 (1970); United States v. DeLuca, 137 F.3d 24 (1st Cir. 1998); Bell v. Evatt, 72 F.3d 421, 433 (4th
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Although there are far fewer cases addressing administrative restrictions on access to court records, as long as a court does not impose
different procedures based on the content of the records, the “time,
place, and manner test” will likely permit the court to impose reasonable
requirements for access that are tied to the court’s administrative
358
needs. Of course, a court must still justify any administrative burdens,
and it cannot impose requirements that effectively deny public access to
359
its records.
2.

Online Access

Now we begin to chart new ground in the debate over public access
to court records. When courts consider providing online access to their
records, they face several important questions. Does the First Amendment require online access? If a court does provide online access to some
of its records, must it provide online access to all of its records? Can a
court impose restrictions on access to electronic records that would be
impermissible if applied to physical records?
The cases do not definitively answer these questions, but the weight
of authority seems to support the conclusion that the First Amendment
does not require courts to provide online access to their records. As long
360
as they provide some means of public access, courts are free to decide
whether to provide online access, and they may choose to make some, or
all, of their records available online. If, however, a court does provide
online access to its records, it will face First Amendment constraints with
regard to how that access is provided.
Cir. 1995); United States v. Hastings, 695 F.2d 1278, 1282 (11th Cir. 1983); Freitas v. Admin. Dir., 92
P.3d 993, 999 (Haw. 2004); Williams v. State, 690 N.E.2d 162, 168–69 (Ind. 1997).
358. The Sixth Circuit, for example, held in Barth v. City of Macedonia that the First Amendment
does not require “contemporaneous and immediate access to court records,” and concluded “the city’s
practice of delaying file requests for twenty four hours is a content neutral restriction because it restricts all speech regardless of content.” No. 98-3700, 1999 WL 427024, at *1 (6th Cir. June 15, 1999).
Not all courts are in agreement, however, that court-imposed delays on public access to court records
are entitled to the highly deferential time, place, and manner test. See, e.g., Courthouse News Serv. v.
Planet, No. CV1108083SJOFFMX, 2016 WL 4157210, at *13 (C.D. Cal. May 26, 2016) (holding that
“the press and public have a qualified right of timely—but not “same-day”—access to newly filed
complaints”); Courthouse News Serv. v. Jackson, No. CIV A H-09-1844, 2009 WL 2163609, at *4 (S.D.
Tex. July 20, 2009) (rejecting application of time, place, and manner test and concluding “that the 24 to
72 hour delay in access is effectively an access denial and is, therefore, unconstitutional”).
359. See, e.g., Grove Fresh Distributors, Inc. v. Everfresh Juice Co., 24 F.3d 893, 897 (7th Cir.
1994) (“In light of the values which the presumption of access [to court records] endeavors to promote, a necessary corollary to the presumption is that once found to be appropriate, access should be
immediate and contemporaneous.”); Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 2016 WL 4157210, at *17 (finding that the Ventura County Superior Court had not met its burden of proving that delays brought on
by its processing of newly filed complaints prior to making them available to the public “is the result of
‘overriding [governmental] interest’ or that such delays are ‘essential to preserve higher values’”)
(quoting Courthouse News Serv. v. Planet, 750 F.3d 776, 793 n.9 (9th Cir. 2014)).
360. See, e.g., McCullen v. Coakley, 134 S. Ct. 2518, 2529 (2014) (noting that the government may
impose reasonable restrictions on the time, place, or manner of protected speech, provided “they leave
open ample alternative channels for communication of the information”) (quoting Ward, 491 U.S. 7 at
791); Nixon v. Warner Commc’ns, Inc., 435 U.S. 589, 609 (1978) (holding that, because the public had
been able to listen to tape recordings played in court, they had no right to physical access to the tapes
as long as the transcripts were made available).
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As a starting point, it should be noted that none of the Supreme
Court’s access cases involved online access to court records. Although
the Court has repeatedly held that the public has a First Amendment
right of access to criminal trials and pre-trial proceedings, and while lower courts have extended that right to civil proceedings and court rec361
ords, the courts appear to be agnostic as to how public access is actually
provided. As described in the previous Section, judges have generally
362
been allowed to decide for themselves how to manage access. From the
layouts of their courtrooms and clerks’ offices, to the number of spectators and visitors they permit to enter their courthouses, the practicalities
of public access have been largely left to individual judges and court administrators.
As a result, the courts have taken it upon themselves to decide
whether—and, if so, to what extent—the public should have online access to their records. Although all of the federal courts and most state
courts provide some form of online access to their court records, all of
the courts that provide online access exclude some records from their
remote access systems that are otherwise available in-person at the
363
courthouse. For example, in Colorado, the state’s court-records policy
states that certain information in electronic court records “is not accessible to the public due to the inability to protect confidential information,”
364
although “[i]t may be available in paper form at local courthouses.”
The list includes “financial files;” “[p]robate cases;” “[a]ddresses, phone
numbers and other contact information for parties;” “[i]nformation related to victims of crime;” “[i]nformation related to witnesses;” and
365
“[i]nformation related to impartial parties.” Similarly, the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure prohibit remote access to records in actions for
366
benefits under the Social Security Act and in certain immigration cases.
Because the First Amendment does not require that the public be
granted online access to court records, courts retain discretion to limit
which records are available through their online access systems. If a court
does provide online access to some or all of its court records, however, it
cannot impose restrictions on who may access those records or how the
information can be used unless those restrictions comply with the First
Amendment. Recall that, pursuant to the unconstitutional conditions
doctrine, the government cannot grant a benefit on the condition that the
beneficiary surrender a constitutional right, even if the government may
367
withhold that benefit altogether.
361. See supra Part III.
362. See supra notes 350–58 and accompanying text.
363. See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c) (prohibiting remote access to records in actions for benefits
under the Social Security Act and in certain immigration cases); COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC
ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.20(b) (listing eight types of information not available via remote access).
364. COLO. JUDICIAL DEP’T, PUBLIC ACCESS TO COURT RECORDS § 4.20(b).
365. Id.
366. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2(c).
367. See supra notes 186–94 and accompanying text.
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V. A NEW PARADIGM FOR RECONCILING COURT ACCESS AND
PRIVACY
Existing approaches to resolving conflicts between court access and
privacy often operate with the assumption that the two interests are irreconcilable. The belief that we have to choose between the right to observe the work of the courts and the right to privacy, however, is too
simplistic and has led to shortsighted solutions for resolving conflicts between these important values.
This Part offers some preliminary thoughts on how we can move
beyond this “zero-sum” thinking. Although it is not possible to eliminate
all private information in court records, courts can substantially reduce
the amount of sensitive information that ends up in their files in the first
place. Courts can also design and manage their online access systems to
reduce privacy risks and can take on a much more active role in studying
the extent of sensitive information in their files, as well as how the information in their records is accessed and used.
A.

Infusing Privacy Principles into the Litigation Process

As an initial matter, we must discard the notion that the protection
of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff. Ensuring that
privacy interests are protected should be the shared responsibility of all
participants in the legal system. The current approach to privacy and
court records can best be described as “dump it all in and let the courts
sort it out.” As discussed below, litigants and their lawyers too often file
every document that seems even remotely relevant to their case, relying
on the court to seal or redact the most sensitive and damaging information. Understaffed and overworked courts, however, do not have the
resources to parse the millions of documents that are filed every year.
The courts must substantially reduce the amount of privacy-harming
information that ends up in their records, much of which is unnecessary
to the adjudication of the parties’ claims. Court records contain an astonishing amount of sensitive information that belies any concern about privacy on the part of the lawyers involved. What follows are just a few examples, but they show the scope of the problem. In the study of North
Carolina Supreme Court files that I conducted with Anne Klinefelter in
2014, we found thousands of incidences of sensitive information in the
368
briefs and appendices filed with the court. In one case, for example, the
State’s brief described the abduction and rape of a ten-year-old girl, naming the child in full on the first page and continuing to identify her by
369
name on nearly every subsequent page of the brief. In another case, the
petition for discretionary review included an appendix with the plaintiff’s
368. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1857–61 (finding that the records contained an average of 113 appearances of sensitive information per document).
369. Brief for the State, filed in State v. Bright, 505 S.E.2d 317 (N.C. App.), review allowed, 525
S.E.2d 179 (N.C. 1998) (also submitted in full to the North Carolina Supreme Court).
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voluminous medical file, which contained highly sensitive medical information along with multiple references to his social security number, date
370
of birth, and home address.
Studies of federal court records reveal the same tendency. In 2008,
Carl Malamud studied a large set of records from the federal PACER
system and found 1,669 documents with social security numbers and oth371
er sensitive information. In a letter to the Chair of the Committee on
Rules of Practice and Procedure, Malamud described a few of the “horror stories” he encountered in the records:
•

In the District of Massachusetts, a 54-page list filed in June 2008
contain[ed] the names, birth dates, [s]ocial [s]ecurity numbers,
372
and medical problems of 353 patients of a doctor.

•

In the District of the District of Columbia, an attorney who was
not paid in what he considered to be a timely fashion by the District of Columbia schools decided to raise his rate to $405/hour
and bill the schools for the difference. To support his claim, he
listed page after page of the names, home addresses, birth dates,
373
and psychological issues for countless minors he saw.

•

In the Central District of Illinois, pension funds representing labor unions frequently attach the unredacted list of all union
374
members and their Social Security numbers.

More recently, in a 2016 case filed by the U.S. Soccer Federation
against the union for the U.S. Women’s National Team, the complaint
attached supporting documents that contained detailed personal information about many of the players—including the home addresses and
375
personal email accounts of some of soccer’s most prominent players.
After the players complained, the U.S. Soccer Federation replaced the
376
filing with a redacted version.
No doubt, lawyers have a variety of reasons for including private
and highly sensitive information in court filings. Some parties even exploit the current system by intentionally putting such information into
377
the public record to cause harm and embarrassment to the other side.
Others may simply not appreciate the privacy interests at stake. Given
the explosion of privacy scholarship, one might assume that everyone
370. Notice of Appeal and Petition for Discretionary Review, filed in Dean v. Cone Mills Corp.,
322 S.E.2d 771 (N.C. 1984).
371. See Letter from Carl Malamud to The Honorable Lee Rosenthal, Chair, Comm. on Rules of
Practice and Procedure, Judicial Conference of the U.S. (Oct. 24, 2008) [hereinafter Malamud Letter
to the Honorable Lee Rosenthal], https://public.resource.org/scribd/7512583.pdf (examining 2,706,431
PDF records).
372. Id. at 2.
373. Id.
374. Id.
375. See Sam Borden & Andrew Das, U.S. Soccer Lawsuit Disclosed Players’ Personal Information, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 5, 2016, at B11.
376. Id.
377. See, e.g., 35A CORPUS JURIS SECUNDUM FEDERAL CIVIL PROCEDURE § 479 (2017) (describing procedures for striking scandalous matters from pleadings).
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thinks deeply about privacy, but this is clearly not the case. Recent studies show that most people, including lawyers, have only a fuzzy under378
standing of privacy.
There are a number of options available that would force the parties
and their lawyers to limit the amount of sensitive information they put in
court records. First, judges can, as described below, promulgate lists of
records and information types that should not be included in court filings
and impose sanctions on parties who file records that contain restricted
information without the court’s permission. Second, the protection of
privacy could be made a part of the ethical and legal obligations a lawyer
379
has to her clients and to the court. Third, at least with regard to represented parties, clients could bring malpractice claims against their attor380
neys for failing to comply with reasonable privacy practices. Fourth,
courts could feature prominent reminders of the privacy risks associated
with court filings and design the user interfaces of their electronic filing
systems to reinforce the need to refrain from filing unnecessary personal
381
information.
In fact, state and federal courts have already begun to shift the burden of protecting private and sensitive information in court records to
382
the lawyers and parties, as have a number of state courts. Rule 5.2 of
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, for example, requires the redaction
of certain personal information in federal filings, both paper and elec383
tronic. A growing number of states have adopted similar require384
ments. One of the leading states is Florida, which has implemented a
378. See Asimina Vasalou et al., Privacy as a Fuzzy Concept: A New Conceptualization of Privacy
For Practitioners, 66 J. ASS’N INFO. SCI. & TECH. 918, 920 (2015); PUBLIC PERCEPTIONS OF PRIVACY
AND SECURITY IN THE POST-SNOWDEN ERA, PEW RESEARCH CTR. (Nov. 12, 2014), http://www.
pewinternet.org/2014/11/12/public-privacy-perceptions/.
379. Attorneys are already bound by principles of confidentiality with regard to client information, which is reflected in the legal ethics rules of every state and in the American Bar Association’s
Model Rule 1.6. See MODEL CODE OF PROF’L CONDUCT r. 1.6 (AM. BAR ASS’N) (Discussion Draft
1983). Similar rules could cover the filing of certain categories of highly sensitive information in court
filings.
380. See Michael Caughey, Comment, Keeping Attorneys from Trashing Identities: Malpractice as
Backstop Protection for Clients Under the United States Judicial Conference’s Policy on Electronic
Court Records, 79 WASH. L. REV. 407, 407 (2004) (“To recover their losses from identity theft, clients
might seek recovery from the attorneys who caused their losses by failing to redact their personal information from court filings.”).
381. The impact of “user interface design” choices on privacy has been studied extensively. See,
e.g., Ira S. Rubinstein & Nathaniel Good, Privacy by Design: A Counterfactual Analysis of Google and
Facebook Privacy Incidents, 28 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 1333, 1365–77 (2013).
382. Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782.
383. FED. R. CIV. P. 5.2. Rule 5.2 states in relevant part:
Unless the court orders otherwise, in an electronic or paper filing with the court . . . a party or
nonparty making the filing may include only:
the last four digits of the social-security number and taxpayer-identification number;
the year of the individual’s birth;
the minor’s initials; and
the last four digits of the financial-account number.
384. See, e.g., N.J. CT. R. 1:38-7(a) (2009) (requiring parties to redact “confidential personal identifiers,” including social security numbers, driver’s license numbers, vehicle plate numbers, insurance
policy numbers, active financial account numbers, and active credit card numbers); N.C. EFILING
RULE 6.3; 204 PA. CODE § 213.7(a) (2015) (requiring parties and their attorneys “to refrain from in-
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strategy to “curtail, or minimize, the inclusion of personal information in
court files that is unnecessary for purposes of adjudication and case man385
agement.” The resulting court rules were the product of extensive research and recommendations from a Study Committee on Privacy and
386
Court Records. The committee urged the Florida Supreme Court to
“address[] the inclusion and dissemination of personal information in
387
court records at the source . . . .” In focusing on the role of the lawyers,
the committee acknowledged that the changes it recommended represented “a fundamental shift in the posture of courts in Florida regarding
the very acceptance of filings” by moving from an “open” filing model to
388
a “controlled” model.
Policies and rules that limit the filing of unnecessary private or sen389
sitive information in court files, a strategy known as “minimization,”
should be expanded, and courts should be aggressive in sanctioning parties and their lawyers for violations. Indeed, there are a number of information types, such as social security numbers and financial account
numbers, that we know have both a high potential for harm and are unlikely to be relevant in the vast majority of cases. In the rare instance
when parties believe there is a legitimate need for such information to be
included in the court file, they can seek the court’s permission to do so.
As the Supreme Court stated in Cox v. Cohn, keeping information out of
court records in the first place is not only preferable to sealing the rec390
ords, but it also avoids First Amendment concerns entirely.
Moreover, if courts do not substantially reduce the amount of private and sensitive information in their files, they will become less appealing as a way to resolve disputes. Indeed, we are already seeing privacy
concerns drive an increase in the use of alternative dispute resolution
(“ADR”) procedures, particularly confidential arbitrations where no
391
public right of access exists at all. Potential litigants who cannot afford

cluding social security numbers and financial information in all documents and exhibits filed with the
court”); In re Implementation of Comm. on Privacy & Court Records Recommendations, 78 So.3d
1045, 1049 (Fla. 2011) (identifying “categories of personal information that must not be filed or must
be truncated or redacted before filing”).
385. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, SUPREME COURT OF FLA., PRIVACY, ACCESS, AND
COURT RECORDS 23 (2005) [hereinafter FL. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS].
386. See D. R. Jones, Protecting the Treasure: An Assessment of State Court Rules and Policies for
Access to Online Civil Court Records, 61 DRAKE L. REV. 375, 415–19 (2013) (describing the work of
the committee and its recommendations).
387. Id. at 419.
388. FL. COMM. ON PRIVACY & COURT RECORDS, supra note 385, at 25–26.
389. Id. at 23.
390. 420 U.S. 469, 496 (1975) (“If there are privacy interests to be protected in judicial proceedings, the States must respond by means which avoid public documentation or other exposure of private
information. . . . Once true information is disclosed in public court documents open to public inspection, the press cannot be sanctioned for publishing it.”).
391. See Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun
Shine in on Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463, 481–82 (2006).
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ADR may simply view the privacy costs as too great and decide not to
392
seek resolution in the courts—or worse, engage in self-help remedies.
B.

Managing Online Access to Reduce Privacy Risks

As discussed above, the First Amendment does not require that
393
courts provide online access to their records. Nevertheless, all of the
federal courts and most state courts provide online access to at least
some of their court records. Although the First Amendment does constrain courts’ ability to restrict who may access online records and how
the information in them may be used, courts retain considerable discretion in how they provide online access to their records.
In setting up and administering online access, courts can address potential privacy concerns in at least two ways. First, because the First
Amendment does not mandate online access, courts can choose to make
only some of their records available online. They can, for example, decide not to allow online access to records associated with highly sensitive
cases, such as juvenile and family court proceedings, or to specific types
of records, such as psychological evaluations and presentence reports.
Courts can also redact sensitive information such as social security numbers and financial account information from documents they make available online. As long as they provide access to the complete versions of
394
these records at the courthouse or elsewhere, courts can choose which
records and information to make available online.
Second, courts can design and manage their online access systems in
ways that enhance privacy. The design and architecture of online access
systems can have a significant impact on how accessible the information
in court records actually is. Choices regarding search interfaces, indexing,
links to other data sources, and bulk downloading not only impact the
395
accessibility of information in court records, they also potentially shape
the uses of the records. In other words, courts can design and manage
their online access systems to impose various levels of practical obscurity
on the information in court records. As Woodrow Hartzog and Frederic
Stutzman note, online obscurity can provide a “useful middle-ground
protection” for sensitive and private information:
By embracing obscurity, courts and lawmakers can avoid the complete opacity created by traditional privacy protections, such as
sealed records. At the same time, courts and lawmakers should pro392. See Karen Eltis, The Judicial System in the Digital Age: Revisiting the Relationship between
Privacy and Accessibility in the Cyber Context, 56 MCGILL L.J. 289, 301–02 (2011) (suggesting that
privacy concerns are “deterring participation in the justice system”) (emphasis omitted); Winn, supra
note 11, at 315 (“Instead of increasing social respect for the judicial system, unrestricted access to
court records will undermine the respect and confidence the courts in this country have traditionally
enjoyed.”).
393. See supra Subsection IV.C.2.
394. For courts that have switched to electronic filing, “courthouse only” access policies typically
entail the use of computer kiosks at the courthouse to provide access to electronic records. See Hulse,
supra note 76, at 17.
395. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 824.
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vide obscurity in situations where they are not willing to provide total secrecy or confidentiality. Hence, obscurity could protect certain
privacy interests while also promoting the dissemination of infor396
mation.
The question, then, is how to design online access systems that maximize the values of both public access and privacy. Of course, no system
of access can provide perfectly frictionless access to court records. Design
decisions impact accessibility and inevitably involve tradeoffs. For example, all of the systems in use today require users to register first (sometimes with a fee) and allow access to the records only through the court’s
proprietary user interface. These user interfaces can vary substantially in
the functionality they offer to users to locate and view records. For example, PACER’s interface does not allow searches based on party name
and location. Therefore, searching for cases involving John Smith, or another common surname, will often return hundreds of hits. Many courts
have also decided not to allow Google to index their electronic records
397
because Google’s search capabilities are considered to be “too good.”
A number of courts also do not allow for bulk downloads through their
398
online access systems.
Courts can also design their online records systems in ways that encourage lawyers and litigants to engage in good privacy practices. For example, the user interface for court-record filers could include prominent
reminders of the need to keep certain information and records out of
court files. The system could also automatically scan materials prior to
filing in order to identify potentially problematic records and information. Highly patterned information such as social security numbers
(“123-12-1234”) and bank statements are relatively easy to find with ex399
isting search tools, and newer statistical approaches that rely on machine learning systems are expanding the range of information types that
400
can be found through automated searches. At the completion of these
scans, filers can be notified of the need to either redact the information
or seek permission to include the information in the filing.
Courts need to understand that, by providing online access to their
records, their role changes from “custodians” of the records to “publish401
ers.” In taking on this new role, courts should carefully consider what
information they wish to make available online and how the loss of practical obscurity impacts privacy. Just because information is publicly
396. Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3, at 44.
397. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 812.
398. See supra note 175.
399. See Lynn E. Sudbeck, Placing Court Records Online: Balancing Judicial Accountability with
Public Trust and Confidence: An Analysis of State Court Electronic Access Policies and a Proposal for
South Dakota Court Records, 51 S.D. L. Rᴇᴠ. 81, 94–96 (2006).
400. See, e.g., Liqiang Geng et al., Using Data Mining Methods to Predict Personally Identifiable
Information in Emails, in ADVANCED DATA MINING AND APPLICATIONS 272 (2008).
401. See THE SEDONA CONFERENCE WORKING GRP.
ON
PROTECTIVE ORDERS,
CONFIDENTIALITY & PUB. ACCESS, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public Access in Civil Cases 57–58 (2007).
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available at the courthouse does not mean it must be available without
limitation through the court’s website. Courts must move beyond the binary conception of privacy that sees information as either public or pri402
vate. As Daniel Solove suggests, “privacy must be understood as an
403
expectation of a limit on the degree of accessibility of information.”
Courts should be careful, however, not to foreclose the benefits that
come from allowing remote access to court records. It is tempting to
think that court records are relevant to only the courtroom participants,
but this is not the case. Many of our most controversial legal, social, and
political issues are debated in the courts. The issues that are played out in
the courts—even in apparently mundane cases—as well as the manner in
which these cases are addressed and resolved by the courts are of pro404
found public concern. Moreover, court records are full of information
on every conceivable issue, from DNA sequencing to the safety of auto405
mobile ignition switches. As Lynn LoPucki has noted, “the courts are
406
among the most information-rich institutions in society.”
The fact is, without online access to court records, the benefits of
public access will be reduced. Curtailing remote access to court records,
for example, would reduce the frequency and quality of media reporting
407
about the courts. It would limit the ability of litigants and their lawyers
408
to assess their likelihood of success in litigation. It would limit the ability of historians to make sense of important legal and social move409
410
ments. It would limit the work of social scientists. And it would di411
minish the accountability of the court system as whole.
402. See supra notes 39–48 and accompanying text.
403. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1141.
404. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 899–901.
405. See id. at 898.
406. LoPucki, supra note 11, at 510.
407. See Brooke Barnett, Note, Use of Public Records Databases in Newspaper and Television
Newsrooms, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 557, 558 (2001) (“If legislatures restrict [online access to public records], not only would some stories prove more difficult or expensive to report, or be reported less
completely, accurately, or quickly, but reporters would miss altogether those stories that result from
routine searching of public records—so-called ‘enterprise stories.’”). Lucy Dalglish, former executive
director of the Reporters Committee for Freedom of the Press, highlighted the important role that
court records play for the media in testimony before the Privacy Subcommittee of the Judicial Conference Standing Committee on the Federal Rules:
We are in a situation where there are a lot fewer journalists in mainstream news organizations. By
having easy access to this information, they are able to do a better job of reporting the news to
the public. There are some jurisdictions—probably not Manhattan, but certainly in places like
Utah—where you have many local newspapers and really only one federal court that covers an
enormous geographic area. Now they are able to accurately and completely report news stories as
well.
Symposium, Panel One: General Discussion on Privacy and Public Access to Court Files, 79 FORDHAM
L. REV. 1, 13 (2010).
408. See Dru Stevenson & Nicholas J. Wagoner, Bargaining in the Shadow of Big Data, 67 FLA. L.
REV. 1337, 1355 (2015).
409. See Margo Schlanger & Denise Lieberman, Using Court Records for Research, Teaching, and
Policymaking: The Civil Rights Litigation Clearinghouse, 75 UMKC L. REV. 155, 161–62 (2006).
410. See David Robinson et al., Government Data and the Invisible Hand, 11 YALE J.L. & TECH.
160, 167 (2009).
411. See Ardia, Court Transparency, supra note 9, at 839; LoPucki, supra note 11, at 533;
Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 409, at 168; Stevenson & Wagoner, supra note 408, at 1353.
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Furthermore, restrictions on electronic access to court records will
negatively impact legal scholarship. Scholars tend to focus their work on
appellate court opinions in part because they are easy to access. The legal realists pointed out this problem decades ago, but only recently have
scholars been able to delve deeply into the raw materials that underlie
412
the work of trial courts. As the noted legal realist Karl Llewellyn explained:
I am a prey, as is every man who tries to work with law, to the apperceptive mass. . . . What records have I of the work of [trial court]
magistrates? How shall I get them? Are there any? And if there
are, must I search them out myself? But the appellate courts make
access to their work convenient. They issue reports, printed, bound,
to be had all gathered for me in libraries. The convenient source of
413
information lures.
This is not to say that courts should always maximize public accessibility when implementing online court-records systems. Rather, it is to
point out that when they evaluate the tradeoffs of various design choices,
they should consider the impact on both privacy and public access.
C.

Identifying Where Privacy Harms Are Greatest

A growing body of research shows that online access to government
records can create substantially greater harms to privacy than existed in
414
the past. Although few, if any, of these harms are new, they are expanding and evolving in ways we have not anticipated and therefore have
not been able to effectively prevent.
At the same time, while we may intuitively feel that some information simply should not be shared with the public, courts must translate
that feeling into an articulable, concrete harm in order to justify re415
strictions on public access to court records. The change from paperbased court-record systems to electronic systems will undoubtedly impact
how courts evaluate privacy risks and harms. Although, as Peter Winn
warns, “[i]t is temptingly easy to assume that if one applies the same set
of rules to electronic judicial records that was applied in the past to paper
records, it will result in the same balance between the various competing
416
policies,” this is clearly not the case.
Online access will likely make the protection of some privacy interests compelling in situations when they may not have been in the past.
412. See David A. Hoffman et al., Docketology, District Courts, and Doctrine, 85 WASH. U. L.
REV. 681, 683–85 (2007) (describing the benefits of conducting empirical research about district courts
using court records).
413. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH: ON OUR LAW AND ITS STUDY 90 (1960).
414. See generally, e.g., Conley et al., supra note 2; Hartzog & Stutzman, supra note 3; Solove,
Access and Aggregation, supra note 8.
415. See, e.g., James Q. Whitman, The Two Western Cultures of Privacy: Dignity Versus Liberty,
113 YALE L.J. 1151, 1220 (2004) (“We cannot simply start by asking ourselves whether privacy violations are intuitively horrible or nightmarish. The job is harder than that.”).
416. Winn, supra note 11, at 315.
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For example, the disclosure of certain types of information that previously appeared to be innocuous, such as social security numbers, can become problematic when the information is combined with other publicly
417
available information, such as birth and property records. As Daniel
Solove notes: “[e]ven information in public records that is superficial or
incomplete can be quite useful in obtaining more data about individuals.
418
Information breeds information.” Indeed, data brokers have built their
businesses on linking disparate pieces of information together, and their
ability to compile detailed profiles on individuals can exacerbate privacy
419
risks.
Scholars have long argued that court records raise substantial privacy concerns, but we have lacked empirical studies about the extent and
context of the information in court records and the harms that can arise
from their disclosure. Such studies are essential to understanding the
threats to privacy that court records present. Any reasoned approach to
addressing privacy must include an assessment of risk. Although some
420
work is being done with regard to these issues, we are only beginning to
develop a sufficient body of research that examines the potential loss of
privacy when court records are made available through online systems
compared with longstanding public access at the courthouse that was
practically obscure due to logistical barriers to access.
Because of the lack of empirical studies, courts have tended to focus
their privacy efforts on the most obvious categories of sensitive information and privacy harms, such as personal identification numbers and
bank account information that can lead to identity theft and financial
421
fraud. Concerns about privacy, however, extend far beyond the limited
422
list of information types and records identified in existing court rules.
Although privacy scholars continue to debate how far privacy protections should extend, groundbreaking work by scholars such as Danielle
423
424
425
Citron, Julie Cohen, and Neil Richards are forcing reconsideration
of the very nature of privacy. Such work has brought important attention
to the broad range of interests that can be implicated by the disclosure of
personal information in public records, ranging from abortion information to voting history. How often such information appears in court
records and how it is being accessed are important questions that courts
can help us answer.
417. See Conley et al., supra note 2, at 782; Marder, supra note 14, at 447.
418. Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8, at 1185.
419. See supra Part II.
420. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1; Conley et al., supra note 2; Malamud Letter to the
Honorable Lee Rosenthal, supra note 371; Solove, Access and Aggregation, supra note 8.
421. See supra notes 333–35.
422. See Ardia & Klinefelter, supra note 1, at 1881–89 (identifying 140 types of sensitive information that can be found in court records).
423. See, e.g., Danielle Keats Citron, Cyber Civil Rights, 89 B.U. L. REV. 61 (2009).
424. See, e.g., JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF: LAW, CODE, AND THE
PLAY OF EVERYDAY PRACTICE (2012).
425. See, e.g., Neil M. Richards, Intellectual Privacy, 87 TEX. L. REV. 387 (2008).
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We also lack empirical research on the impact that online access to
426
court records has on court transparency and accountability. Again, we
intuitively feel that the benefits of public access are enhanced by online
access, but we can do better than simply rely on anecdotes. Furthermore,
research about how court records are used will help us understand why
we value public access in the first place. As Felix Wu points out, “conceptions of accountability, a form of utility relevant here, are crucial to
understanding the balance between privacy and utility with respect to ac427
cess to court records.”
One of the benefits of electronic court-record systems is that the
courts now have the means to easily collect information about the court
records the public is accessing. Even the most basic electronic records
systems can track which records have been accessed, who has accessed
them, and from what location (online or at a courthouse kiosk). Electronic record systems can also provide information about the types of
cases and records viewed, as well as how many individual records a specific user downloaded. This data can provide valuable insight into how
the information in court records is being used. Moreover, for systems
that require a credit card for the payment of access fees, such as PACER,
the courts can also glean a great deal of information about the users
428
themselves.
Although courts have been very active in convening committees and
working groups to consider new access policies, they have been far less
active in supporting research on the extent of private and sensitive information in their files and on how their records are accessed and used.
As courts across the country continue to develop policies and systems for
online access to court records, it will be critical for them to rely on—and
support—studies that examine the nature of the privacy harms that can
arise from online access, as well as the impacts that various design decisions are likely to have on court transparency.
VI. CONCLUSION
The current framework for dealing with sensitive information in
court records is broken. We cannot continue to count on the courts to
sort through the avalanche of records that lawyers and parties file and
hope that judges or court staff will catch every appearance of sensitive
information and either seal the records or redact the harmful information. Our understaffed and overworked court systems simply do not
have the resources to do this.
Until recently, we have been able to rely on the obscurity of court
records to protect privacy interests, but we can no longer do so. As
426. Some important work is being done on this issue. See Barnett, supra note 407; Hoffman, supra note 412; LoPucki, supra note 11; Schlanger & Lieberman, supra note 409.
427. Felix T. Wu, Defining Privacy and Utility in Data Sets, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 1117, 1176
(2013).
428. Some of this information raises privacy concerns of its own.
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courts increasingly embrace electronic filing systems and implement
online public access, the potential risks to privacy can no longer be discounted or waved away as the necessary price of court transparency.
Although online court-record systems have brought substantial benefits
429
430
to the public —and to the courts themselves —the loss of practical obscurity that has accompanied their adoption has ignited a debate about
the privacy risks that arise from public access to court records.
Concerns about commercial exploitation of court records and the
loss of practical obscurity are threatening to push judges and legislators
to drastically curtail the public’s right of access to the courts. Indeed, a
number of courts are moving away from the careful balancing of interests
that have traditionally guided judges in access disputes and instead are
excluding whole categories of information, documents, and cases from
public access. This approach, while superficially appealing, is contrary to
established First Amendment doctrines that mandate a presumption of
public access and require case-specific analysis before public access can
be restricted.
Fortunately, courts have a variety of tools at their disposal to reduce
the threats to privacy that come from electronic court records. First, because the First Amendment does not mandate online access, courts can
choose to make only some of their records available online. They can, for
example, decide not to allow online access to records associated with
highly sensitive cases, such as juvenile and family court proceedings, or
to specific types of records, such as psychological evaluations and presentence reports. Courts can also redact sensitive information such as social
security numbers and financial account information from documents they
431
make available online.
Second, courts can design and manage their online access systems in
ways that enhance privacy. Choices regarding search interfaces, indexing,
and bulk downloading not only impact the accessibility of information in
court records, they also shape the uses of the records. In other words,
courts can design and manage their online access systems to impose various levels of practical obscurity on the information in their records.
Courts should be careful, however, not to foreclose the benefits that
come from allowing online access to court records. As I have described
here and in prior work, court transparency is a fundamental tenant of
American democracy.
429.
430.

See supra Part III.
See, e.g., J. DOUGLAS WALKER, NAT’L CTR. FOR STATE COURTS, ELECTRONIC COURT
DOCUMENTS: AN ASSESSMENT OF JUDICIAL ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT AND DATA INTERCHANGE
TECHNOLOGY 15 (1999) (“With the nearly continuous rise in volume and complexity of the paperwork
involved in the judicial process . . . technology and electronic communications could offer a better alternative to the flood of paper forms and documents.”); Jones, supra note 386, at 378 (“Implementation of e-filing is rising as courts, faced with limited budgets and lack of space, consider alternatives to
maintaining print records.”).
431. As long as they provide access to the complete versions of these records at the courthouse or
elsewhere, courts can choose which records and information to make available online. See supra Section V.B.
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Third, and most importantly, we must discard the notion that the
protection of privacy is exclusively the job of judges and court staff. Ensuring that privacy interests are protected should be the shared responsibility of all participants in the legal system. Even a cursory glance at
court records shows that they contain an astonishing amount of private
and sensitive information, much of which is irrelevant to the underlying
claims. Accordingly, we must shift the obligation for protecting privacy
to lawyers and litigants, who should not be permitted to include private
and sensitive information in court files if it is not relevant to the adjudication of their case.

